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Abstract
Human security is an essential aspect of human rights, as it is necessary for every human to 
feel secured in their community, and country at large. However, human security is frequently 
threatened by conflict, especially in Africa. Adding to the different challenges that most 
African states face, conflict contributes immensely towards destabilizing human security. As 
such, this thesis addresses the destabilized human security situation in Nigeria, by examining 
the implication of the Boko Haram insurgency. The effects of the Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria, ranges from political, economic, social, cultural, to environmental. These insecurities 
have led to the destabilisation of the country and its economy. Although human security is 
broad, this thesis focuses on the political and socio-economic implications of the Boko Haram 
insurgency. This includes, but not limited to, poverty and illiteracy, unemployment, poor 
healthcare service, displacement, national insecurity, and political instability. The thesis argues 
that the Nigerian government has been unable to defeat the insurgent group due to the 
increasing rate of corruption in the country, which in turn leads to lack of adequate human and 
material resources need to win the group.  
In conducting this research, a literature-based methodology was employed, where secondary 
data, in the form of books, newspapers, online articles/journals, and reports, that have been 
written on the topic, were critically analysed to draw up adequate information on the activities 
of Boko Haram and it implications on the human security of the country. 
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1.1.  Background 
It is important to briefly understand the situation in Nigeria that helped breed terrorism in the 
country. Few years after the gaining of their independence, Nigeria began to experience 
economic instability, political frustration, ethnic conflicts and religious crisis began to 
negatively affect the people. As Addaney (2016) argued, the economic instability in the country 
led to increased poverty rate, of which the northerners were more vulnerable to. The increasing 
rate of poverty was exacerbated when the Igbos, then known as the Biafrans, decided to break 
away from Nigeria; an act caused by both economic instability and ethnic crisis (Ordu, 2017). 
Between 1967 to 1970, the Biafrans fought against the Nigerian government and northerners 
in the bid to breakout of the country, this war further exacerbated the economic instability in 
the country, which, although the war ended since 1970, its effect socio-economic and political 
remained continued to divide the country. The level of frustration that the people were 
experiencing as a result of the economic crisis, ethnic conflicts, political suppression made it 
easy for terrorism to be founded and thrive in the country.  
 
Moving years forward, with all the different issues Nigeria was experiencing, its political 
pillars were destroyed, thus made it a breeding ground for terrorism. Terrorism has also led to 
increased human rights violations. There have been reports of children being abducted by 
militant groups, raping of girls and women, destruction of properties, continual displacement 
and increased poverty in the country. Resulting from this has been the increased rate of human 
insecurity in parts of Nigeria, especially in the northern region where terrorist groups are most 
dominant and tend to thrive.  
 
Terrorism has increasingly become a major concern for the international community. It is a 
critical issue on the security agenda of international organisations such as the African Union 
(AU) and the United Nations (UN). The trend of terrorism in Africa has grown since the early 
2000s, and this has increased insecurity on the continent, making human insecurity a major 
issue of concern in Africa. There is a need to first understand what terrorism is, which some 
scholars have defined as ‘small’ war (Held, 2003). Just as there are different types of war, there 
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are different types of terrorism, though many tend to generalise the term. Terrorism varies 
based on the motives of the group. The variations include: political terrorism, social terrorism, 
and economic terrorism, but all these different types usually have a similar effect on the society 
(Held, 2003). Terrorism always leads to human insecurity, be it in the political, social, 
economic, or cultural aspects. Such is the case in contemporary Nigeria whereby the 
insurgency of Boko Haram Sect threats have led to high levels of displacement and increased 
poverty, which in turn lead to human insecurity.  Accordingly, the thesis explores the various 
ways in which Boko Haram negatively impacts on Nigerian social life. 
 
Boko Haram is an Islamic extremist group in Nigeria, which emerged around 2002. The term 
Boko Haram means “western education is forbidden” (Shuaibu & Salleh, 2015). Although the 
group started off as a charity group, which ‘educated’ people willing to learn about Islamic 
education and gave arms to those they preached to, it has now become a major terrorist group 
in Nigeria, whose incursions have spread to Cameroon and Niger. Its insurgency has led to the 
loss of many lives, destruction of schools and government infrastructure (Shuaibu & Salleh, 
2015). Boko Haram’s activities are negatively affecting Nigeria; causing political and 
economic instability, specifically, in the north-east region. By its activities, Boko Haram 
undermines human security. 
 
Human security is a broad concept encapsulating various components, including food, 
personal, environment, etc. This thesis, however, focuses mainly on the socio-economic and 
political aspects of human insecurity. It examines the impact of Boko Haram on the political 
stability of Nigeria based on the reality that there is evidence of increased political instability 
due to terrorist activities by Boko Haram. Terrorism has affected Nigeria’s economic strength 
due to loss of investments and a decrease in entrepreneurship levels. Due to the violent terrorist 
attacks, foreign investors situated in the northern part of the country have been forced to leave. 
The security risks associated with the attacks led many to abandon their businesses and to 
relocate, while some have lost their businesses due to attacks, thus affecting their ability to 
work. The socio-economic and political effects of Boko Haram’s insurgency have affected the 
Nigerian people, and this can only be rectified if Boko Haram is defeated.  
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1.2. Statement of problem 
For over a decade, human security in Nigeria continues to be negatively affected, as a result of 
the Boko Haram insurgency in the country. Boko Haram has embarked on countless 
kidnappings of school children and women, destroying school buildings and government 
institutions, shop looting, as well as bombing marketplaces, farmyards and villages in northern 
parts of the country. Not only are they a huge threat to the country, their activities are costing 
the country socially, economically and politically, both at the local and international levels. 
 
1.3.  Research question 
How is Boko Haram’s insurgency in Nigeria affecting the socio-economic and political aspects 
of human security in the country? 
 
1.4.  Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework of this thesis is human security.  
 
Akokpari (2007) defines human Security as the “security of the people”, living a secured life 
in their own country, with a government that makes sure that its citizens have access to basic 
needs, without fear or forceful external interventions. Akokpari (2007) also conceptualised 
human security in line with the United Nations (UN) definition: “being free from fear, having 
the freedom to ‘want’ and to take actions and make decisions by one’s self”. In order for 
citizens to be able to attain these freedoms, the government needs to create an avenue that is 
non-discriminatory and one which aids citizens to overcome economic, health, environmental, 
personal, community, and political insecurities.  
 
1.5.  Research design 
This thesis is a library-based study; the researcher conducted analysis of different publications, 
news articles, and books on the Boko Haram insurgency. Being a project which focuses on the 
socio-economic and political aspects of human insecurity, the study analysed works that 
discuss aspects of human insecurity. The library-based thesis highlights criticisms, different 
interpretations, and evaluations drawn from a range of selected articles. This style of research 
design enabled the writer to make evidence-based conclusions, based on concrete scholarly 
discourse on the impact of Boko Haram’s insurgency on Nigeria’s socio-economic and political 
aspects of human insecurity.  
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1.6. Methodology  
Academic articles and media reports were drawn from online resources, including J-Stor and 
Google scholar, while books, newspapers and government articles were sourced from the 
University of Cape Town (UCT) library’s resources. The study was qualitative in nature since 
it did not involve the gathering of non-numeric data. 
 
The researcher expected to incur challenges such as: not finding current publications that 
address the human security implications of the Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria. The most 
current book publication on the topic is from 2016. Although it is not too far back, it does not 
address the current state of affairs in Nigeria and how Boko Haram’s insurgency is currently 
affecting the country’s socio-economic and political human security. It is noteworthy that this 
challenge also created, for the researcher, the opportunity to fill in gaps in existing literature 
on the topic.  
 
1.7.  Research ethics 
The thesis is mainly a critique and review of several sources of literature on the topic in 
question. As such it did not require ethical clearance since no data would be derived from 
human interaction processes. 
 
1.8.  Synopses of chapters  
Chapter two focuses on the conceptual framework; it discusses the different understandings of 
human security, using a definition provided by the African Union Non-Aggressive and 
Common Defence Pact (AUNCDP). The section also defines different components of human 
security, namely: personal, economic, political, food, environmental, community, and health 
security. The chapter also provides insight into the different causes of human insecurity and 
alludes to debates around the concept.  
 
Chapter three looks at the emergence of the Boko Haram group, from its early years in 2002 to 
its violent re-emergence in 2009. In addition, it discusses the insurgency of Boko Haram in 
Nigeria. The Nigerian government’s intervention in response to the Boko Haram insurgency is 
also explored in the chapter. The section also highlights the limitations of the government’s 
intervention in defeating Boko Haram. 
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Chapter four looks at the implications of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It focuses 
specifically on the socio-economic and political aspects of human security. As such, it 
discusses the socio-economic and political  implications of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.  
 
Chapter five provides a brief summary of the thesis. It also provides recommendations for 




Conceptual Framework: Human Security 
 
The researcher employed a human security centred conceptual framework. Human security 
remain a global concept, and it seeks to shift focus from the state to the wellbeing of the people. 
This chapter explains the concept by highlighting the competing definitions, sources or causes 
of human (in)security, as well as some of its leading intellectual criticisms.  
2.1. What is human security? 
Prior to the introduction of the concept of human security, the state was the focus of security 
in international relations (Akokpari, 2007). Any security matter was centred around the state 
and its wellbeing. However, after the Cold War, the focus started to shift away from the state 
to the people. As presented by the late former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, “the 
prevention of conflict begins and ends with the protection of human life and the promotion of 
human development” (Franche and Ebata, 2004:12). The effect of the Cold War was so intense 
that world leaders saw the need for an intervention, hence Annan’s statement. According to 
him, conflict could be prevented if human security becomes a major aspect of focus of the 
international community. Hence, the shift to human security.  
 
There was a paradigm shift from a realist viewpoint to a liberal viewpoint. As Annan posited 
that the concept of security had for long been interpreted narrowly, as the security of countries 
against external influence and aggression (UNDP, 1994). His assertion is a realist idea, which 
has always been the nature of the international community, whereby states tend to focus on 
protecting their territories and national interests, while neglecting the security of the people. 
While based on the liberalist viewpoint, the people matter more, and as such should be the 
focus of the international community (Slaughter, 2011). Seeing that the world is becoming 
more liberal, human security has gone beyond just states’ interests to focusing on the security 
of the people. For example, by considering food, economic, health, environmental, personal, 
community and political factors as determinants of human security.  
 
Countries now consider the affairs of the people and how to ensure that their insecurity is 
minimized at all costs. Since the end of Cold War, the UN has adopted human security as a 
guiding concept for the international community. The organization believes that it is useful in 
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assisting “member states in identifying and addressing widespread and crosscutting challenges 
to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people, [as it ] calls for people-centred, 
comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the 
protection and empowerment of all people” (United Nations, 2018). With the shift from state 
to people, more states are becoming welfare states. It is, however, arguable that, regardless of 
this shift, the national security of states is still a major focus in international relations. Also, 
increasing conflicts in the international community are making it difficult for human security 
to be achieved, especially in developing countries.  
 
Before diving deeper into the different understandings of the definition of human security, the 
different components of the concept will be discussed. According to the 1994 United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report, threats to human security are 
seen in the various areas, economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and 
political security (UNDP, 1994).  
a. Economic security: provides people with the means to access employment which will 
enable them to earn secure basic needs (UNDP, 1994; Tadjbakhsh, 2005; Akokpari, 
2007). Citizens are expected to cater for themselves, without being dependent on the 
government, therefore it is important that they have access to employment in order for 
them to earn and sustain their livelihoods. In most developing countries, access to 
employment is a major challenge as there seems to be fewer jobs available for the 
numbers of people seeking employment opportunities. Economic security is expected 
to eradicate poverty, in the long run. 
b. Food security: is having physical and economic access to food and a balanced diet 
(UNDP, 1994; Gomez and Gasper, 2013). To have food security, one needs to have 
economic security in order to acquire food and provide for oneself, with the right 
nutrients to sustain them.  
c. Health security: Akokpari defines this as having “access to health facilities, medical 
care and basic drugs, protection from all forms of communicable and non-
communicable diseases” (2007:9). In this case, government needs to build and maintain 
functional healthcare facilities for its people. All citizens should have access to these 
facilities, and adequate numbers of well trained professionals should be employed into 
the health sector. In most developing countries, access to healthcare is a challenge, and 
there are high rates of poor health services, due to poorly trained medical professionals. 
This in turn leads to high death rates and increasing spread of diseases.  
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d. Environmental security: includes making sure that natural resources are protected and 
that they are used in sustainable ways, to ensure that future generations’ access to them 
is not compromised (Tadjbakhsh, 2005; UNDP, 1994). Environmental insecurity leads 
to health issues higher rates of pollution. It is important that governments enforce laws, 
rules and regulations which will protect the environment and natural resources from 
being exploited and damaged by current generations.  
e. Personal security: “this means freedom from physical violence caused either by the 
state, groups or individuals” (UNDP, 1994; Akokpari, 2007:9). Most definitions of 
human security seem to focus more on this type of security because of the notion that 
human security is a focus on people. States need to make sure that their citizens are 
protected from physical violence and that they have the freedom to access their wants, 
make decisions and take actions free from coercion and with freedom from fear. It is, 
however unfortunate that most states have not been able to attain this particular form 
of security, which is arguably one of the most important types of human security.  
f. Community security: having the freedom to belong to any community without being 
harassed, intimidated or faced with violence (Tadjbakhsh, 2005; Akokpari, 2007). This 
type of security, if attained, will enable families to stay united, and it could reduce cases 
of racial, ethnic and religious violence.  
g. Political security: being able to have the freedom to hold personal political views, 
ideologies, and parties, and having the freedom to express those views (UNDP, 1994; 
Tadjbakhsh, 2005; Akokpari, 2007). This type of security is also one of the major types 
of human security, and one that has contributed to human insecurity over the years. 
Political division continues to divide the people, causing conflicts and the violation of 
human rights, which in turn affects a country’s ability to attain human security for its 
people.  
 
This thesis suggests that conflict is one of the central threats to human security. Some observers 
believe that conflict can be avoided, which means that human security can be attained (Cilliers, 
2004). The late former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, is one of those who posited that 
conflict is evitable; this he conveyed by emphasising that, “for too long, conflict in Africa has 
been seen as inevitable or intractable, or both. It is neither. Conflict in Africa, as everywhere, 
is caused by human action, and can be ended by human action” (Cilliers, 2004:1). Since conflict 
is a result of human actions, it is possible for it to be avoided by redressing the actions which 
led to the conflict. This is because, the existence of conflict hinders the attainment of human 
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security, due to the constant and increased violation of human rights that occur during periods 
of violent conflict. Human security considerations need to be prioritised in order to achieve 
positive growth and development in any country. This is so because human security enhances 
citizens’ potential to become economically progressive. There are various definitions of human 
security. The following subsection discuss different authors’ conceptualisation of the concept 
of human security.   
 
Although there are various definitions of human security, this study applied the definition 
provided by the Africa Union Non-Aggressive and Common Defence Pact (AUNCDP). This 
is so because the definition puts into perspective, most, if not all the different aspects of the 
concept. The AUNCDP defines human security, within the African context, to mean: 
The security of the individual in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic needs. It also 
includes the creation of social, economic, political, environmental and cultural 
conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and 
respect for human rights, good governance, and the guarantee for each individuals of 
opportunities and choices for his/her full development (AUNCDP, 2005:5).  
 
One can argue that, the above definition, puts into consideration broader aspects of security, 
which other definitions did not consider. It addresses individuals’ access and satisfaction of 
basic needs, the need for a friendly political, social and military environment, respect for 
human rights, et cetera. It is important to consider basic human rights in the attainment of 
human security. Unlike the AUNCDP’s (2005) definition, others consider human security as 
the freedom from physical hurt, threats, injury and abuse (Cilliers, 2004). This is not to say, 
one definition is more accurate than the other; there are different dimensions to understanding 
the concept. Human security encompasses all the above mentioned because “conditions of 
abject poverty or powerlessness are not quantitatively different from vulnerability to physical 
violence during conflict” (Cilliers, 2004:8).  Human security should not take a specific focus; 
rather it should take into consideration all factors that make people insecure in their 
communities. Human security goes beyond the state’s interest, or individual interests. Rather 
it focuses on the security of the whole, the individual, local communities, states, and the 
international community at large. In addition, the systems in place, within a country, which 
further perpetuate violence and marginalize certain groups, should be considered when 
devising strategies for the achievement of human security (Gomez and Gasper, 2013). Those 
systems/structures need to be addressed within the human security concept, in order to bring 
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about total human security for the people. The political-social systems that prevent citizens, 
groups, and states from being able to access their freedom, hinder human security.  
 
Furthermore, another angle of understanding human security, which seems to collapse all 
definitions is the “freedom from fears, freedom from want, and freedom to take actions on 
one’s own behalf” (Akokpari, 2007:11). ‘Freedom from fear’ is being free from 
conflict/violence or any factor that causes physical harm. While ‘freedom from want’ is being 
free from hunger or poverty. It also entails being able to take actions without fear or external 
pressure. However, it is almost impossible for one to be able to take actions without any form 
of external pressure or influence, nor is it totally possible for one to have full access to their 
wants nor live totally without fear. This particular definition is therefore problematic and too 
generic (John, 2014). To further understand this definition, on the notion of ‘freedom from 
fear’, it becomes challenging, seeing that absolute freedom is not attainable. Also, there have 
been questions about the notion of fear, inquiring what exactly constitutes as fear, and fear 
from what (Kettemann, 2006)? The argument that this definition is too general can be traced 
to the fact that it did not give details on the type(s) of fear. As Morgan (2009) argues, fear 
comes in different types; there is emotional, physical, mental, and psychological fear. Does 
being free from mental, psychological or emotional fear mean one’s human security is intact?  
Does being free from physical fear translate to human security? Finally, how can these 
freedoms from fear and want, as well as to take action, be quantified or measured? Human 
security should therefore be seen as a framework used to achieve a greater end (Henk, 2005). 
Seeing human security as a means to an end will serve as a strategy for freedom from fear and 
want to be achieved, rather than seeing human security as standalone entity that is to be attained 
on its own.  
 
Moving forward, unlike the collapsed version, the AUNCDP’s (2005) definition of human 
security covers the individual/personal, local/community, national, regional, and international 
aspects. Although individual security is founded on the freedom from abuses, injuries, physical 
hurt, and threats, sometimes factors such as diseases, environmental contamination, and 
hunger, tend to be of more importance in attaining individual security (Cilliers, 2004). 
Establishing the fact that human security is focused on the people, individual human rights 
need to be put in place or addressed. Until global leaders understand this point, human security 
will not be fully achieved.  
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It is a myth to think that total human security is attainable. This is because of the increasing 
levels of violence, decline in standard of living, economic instability, and environmental 
degradation, to mention a few. Africa continues to be one of the continents with increasing 
rates of violence; where the state is unable to monopolize force, terrorism thrives and continues 
to grow on the continent (Cilliers, 2004). With this, human security remains a far-fetched goal 
on the continent. It is worth noting that South Africa is said to be the first African country to 
subscribe to the contemporary definition of human security, thus making it a welfare state. 
This, however, does not mean that it has been able to achieve complete human security. 
Nevertheless, compared to most African states, the government of South Africa has been able 
to provide its people with some level of personal security (Cilliers, 2004). 
 
To conclude, regardless of the different understandings of human security, it still remains a 
pursuit for the rights of the people. Be it the right to good healthcare, clean environment, 
freedom of political ideologies, right to access food and employment, freedom from fear, and 
the right to belong to any chosen community, they are all geared towards the people, not the 
state.  
 
2.2. Causes of human insecurity 
There are many causes of human insecurity. However, for this thesis, the following causes will 
be discussed: poverty and economic instability, political actions and social instability, food and 
environmental issues, and terrorism.  
 
Human insecurity can be seen from the perspective of the lack and/or absence of human 
economic, social, political rights, etc. In this case, Ogege (2013) sheds light on the opposite of 
security, that is insecurity, defined as the inability of a nation to provide basic needs for its 
people, protect and develop itself without constant external interventions, and whatever 
tendencies that might undermine a nation’s cohesion, values, properties and the lives of its 
people. Therefore, human insecurity is the lack of measures to achieve freedom and rights of 
the individuals within the state (Ogege, 2013). Whereby, this affects their ability to go about 
their daily lives in peace, and/or without fear of harmful disruption of their properties and lives 
(Piazza, 2006). In many cases, human insecurity has led to the forced migration of people, in 
search of better living standards, and to free oneself from the violence within their society.  
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2.2.1. Poverty and Economic Instability   
Poverty and insecurity are cyclical, which makes it difficult to determine which one leads to 
the other (Akokpari, 2007). Increasing poverty and economic instability have always 
negatively affected human security, especially on the African continent. More than 70% of 
world’s population live in poverty thus preventing about half of the world’s population from 
accessing basic human rights (Shah, 2013). The UNDP report of 2005 indicated that Africa 
suffers the most as about 40% of its population falls below the poverty line (UNDP, 2005; 
Akopkari, 2007). About 40% of Africans are economically vulnerable and unstable and they 
lack basic rights and access to good healthcare, educational and social rights because of their 
economic disadvantage. Poverty has been said to make people vulnerable by denying them 
their rights, which is the case with most Africans living below the poverty line (Shah, 2013).  
 
Poverty and economic instability, although they are not exactly the same, can be used 
interchangeably. This is because, for example, in the case of South Africa, economic instability 
has led to a sharp increase in income gaps which has affected the poverty rate in the country 
(Shah, 2013). This has further affected food security in the country, where nearly 26% of the 
people suffer from hunger on a daily basis (Oxford, 2018). The country’s economic instability 
is linked to its poverty rate, and vice versa. Poverty makes it difficult for people to have access 
to good education and balanced diets. This is because those who are mostly affected lack the 
funds to access quality education, which further marginalizes them (Knight, 2013). When one 
does not access quality education, such a person is not able to gain the necessary skills needed 
for them to venture into the job market. As such, they are not able to access jobs that will earn 
them enough to elevate them from poverty. This therefore affects their access to balanced diets 
and food in general. This, in essence, leads to persistent cycles of poverty throughout one’s 
life. As Akopkari (2007) argued, poverty tends to be inherited, because of its cyclical nature. 
Families living in poverty, not having enough resources to send their children to quality schools 
or to provide them with a balanced diet, end up with malnourished children without basic skills 
for quality employment. This therefore means that, such an individual will have to settle for 
menial jobs, hence low incomes and persistent poverty (Shah, 2013). Also, when parents do 
not leave behind any property for their children, as a result of poverty, they are unable to fall 
back on to something to keep them going. And, given their low-skilled nature, they are forced 
to fend within their means, thus keeping them in the poverty zone.  
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Furthermore, when government is unable to provide its people with the needed access to quality 
education, citizens become insecure and they lack the freedom to access their basic rights 
(Tadjbakhsh, 2005). Not having the monetary freedom to access one’s rights, including quality 
education and healthcare, contributes immensely to human insecurity. Although one can argue 
that government is not totally responsible for providing human security for its people, it 
however plays a major role in it. The state should be able to provide: state owned quality 
schools, employment opportunities, state owned quality healthcare services, as well as 
subsidized and affordable food supplies that are accessible to the general public (Piazza, 2006; 
Shah, 2013). In so doing, the government will be able to mitigate the lack of access to quality 
skilled jobs for its people, which in turn will reduce poverty in the country. Also, having 
accessing to quality education could empower some to become entrepreneurial and build their 
own wealth.  
 
Finally, the economic instability of a country intensifies the poverty rate of such country. A 
state need to make sure that it stabilizes its economy, protects local businesses from 
international ones, and endeavours to thrive internationally (Piazza, 2006). This will have the 
positive effect of reducing poverty thereby increasing the levels of human security within 
states. Apart from poverty and economic instability, political actions and instability also 
contribute to human insecurity. 
 
2.2.2. Political action and social instability  
In most societies where human insecurity is rife, people are usually mistreated by political 
leaders. Political actions play a major role in shaping the way people feel, they either feel secure 
or insecure. And in this case, when political leaders put their own interests above those of the 
people, it causes the people to lose faith in them. Corruption is a prevailing element that affects 
human security (Akopkari, 2007). For example, African countries are known for their high 
levels of human insecurity and corruption, which are both interlinked. Most African political 
leaders violate the human rights of their people and they abuse public offices for their own 
benefit, which negatively impacts on human security (Smith-Bingham, 2016). When citizens 
lack freedom of speech or expression, they begin to lose their human rights and security. They 
then begin to develop fear of the system and government, hence some of them may be forced 
to migrate in an effort to regain their security. This is so because, in some cases, people who 
speak against the government are arrested. The constant violation of human rights by the 
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government makes it difficult for the people to freely live their daily lives (Piazza, 2006). 
Human security therefore becomes an issue because political leaders would rather protect their 
own interests, rather than to protect their people’s human rights.     
 
Social instability, on the other hand, is not only a factor which leads to human insecurity; it is 
also a threat to economic growth and political order (Knight, 2013. Social instability is when 
social justice is not in place, thus leading to the increase in social problems, while limiting 
social progress (Knight, 2013). Social instability can be caused by various factors, including: 
inequality, insecurity and poverty, just to name a few, and these tends to lead to unemployment, 
illiteracy, etc (Knight, 2013). As indicated above, poverty plays a major role in causing human 
insecurity, which is seen here to be one of the major causes of social instability. Hence citizens 
lack the freedom to social benefits and justice, and they are not able to access basic healthcare, 
education and social services, which in turn affects their standard and quality of good living. 
Not having the security of social justice and not being confident in the state to provide one with 
appropriate social representation and justice in the country, affects the level of security for 
individuals within the state.  In Africa, more than 20,000 children die on a daily basis, due to 
the lack of basic social services which are required in order to keep them alive. In most cases, 
they are quietly removed and not recorded to the increasing rate of deaths caused by lack of 
governmental provision of social services (Shah, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, although linked to political instability, lack of political participation and/or 
government’s refusal to grant citizens free and fair political participation, continues to affect 
human security, where those who stand against the government’s corrupt actions are usually 
made to pay direly for it. As seen in most African countries, the one time that citizens have to 
participate in political events, is usually during voting processes, which are in most cases 
usually interrupted by governmental officials. Voters’ lives and freedom are put to risk (Smith-
Bingham, 2016). Not having the freedom to vote, and not being given the opportunity to make 
decisions of who should legitimately lead a country, affects citizens in that, they are forced to 
live with whoever goes into power, even when the leader in question is not providing them 
with their necessary human security needs. When people are unhappy with the state of the 
country, the political leaders and their governance of the country, the way they live, their 
economy etc., they tend to feel insecure and lose trust in the system, thus robbing them of their 
human security. In some cases, sections of society can incite rebellion/revolution, in the bid to 
free themselves from the system and conditions of human insecurity.  
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Conflict are known for their ability to cause inhuman insecurity due to increased levels of 
violence and the loss of faith in the system by the people. Folarin defines conflict as having 
disagreement and/or hostility towards another people, or between two or more people (Folarin, 
2015). It can either be verbal or physical, and has been argued to be inevitable.  Considering 
the fact that conflict is inevitable, in politics it occurs when rival parties stand against each 
other, with each intending to eliminate the other. Akokapri (2017) lists the following as effects 
of conflict on human security: it causes grave sufferings on people, especially women, children 
and elderly, leads to the creation of child soldiers, and it generates refugees and internally 
displaced persons.  
 
During armed conflict, those who are mostly affected are women, children and the elderly, due 
to their already vulnerable positions in society. They are usually unable to defend themselves, 
or actively engage in the fight to further their own interest. As a result, they are the ones that 
bear the brunt of the conflict. Where women and girls are constantly subjected to rape as a 
weapon of war, they are made to live in fear and they endure life-long trauma as a result of 
their war experiences, which makes it difficult for them to feel secure. A case example is that 
of the Rwandan genocide whereby the Tutsi and Hutu fought against each other and women 
and girls were used as a ‘scapegoat’, to relay animosity between rivals (Smith, 2004). Given 
the harmful effects of rape, human insecurity in the country rose to levels higher than had ever 
been recorded.  
During conflict people become forcefully displaced from their places of residence, thus making 
it challenging for them to access their human rights, therefore their human security is affected. 
As Akopkari (2007) posits that the rate of conflict in African states had spawned large number 
of refugees by 1992. For example, in Somalia there were about “870,000 refugees, 850,000 in 
Ethiopia, 670,000 in Liberia, 400,000 in Angola and 270,000 in Sudan” (2007:25). Due to the 
bombings and destroying of homes and resources, people are forced to relocate, seeing that 
their homes are no longer existent and the society has become dangerous to live in, they leave 
to find places of refuge. Over the years, refugee camps have been built in order to accommodate 
those who have been displaced from their homes. Not having a safe place to stay when one’s 
properties and home have been destroyed by bombings and fights, their human security is lost. 
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2.2.3. Food and Environmental Issues  
Other causes of human insecurity are food and environmental issues. Food insecurity continues 
to negatively impact on human security (Akopkari, 2007). Food crisis is a major threat to 
human security in third world countries, especially in Africa. According to UNICEF (2006), 
about 28 percent of children in Africa are underweight, as a result of malnutrition derived from 
the food crisis that the continent is currently experiencing. Food insecurity remains a challenge 
hence global efforts to eradicate hunger. The latest Global Food Policy report, released in 2018, 
showed that malnutrition is on the rise (CNBC Africa News, 2019).  
Malnutrition affects one’s ability to function normally, which means that such a person is 
neither able to actively participate in their society, nor access their human rights. In children, 
for example, with the high rate of malnutrition amongst them, they are unable to function well 
in schools and their bodies are prone to sickness (UNICEP, 2019). It is difficult to provide 
medical help to someone who is suffering from malnutrition because the body needs food 
before it can respond to medication. Finally, the food crisis contributes to the increasing 
number of deaths in Africa, whereby rising hunger and malnutrition levels continue to affect 
the living standards of the people, thus putting them at risk of mortality (Food and Agricultural 
Organisation of the United Nations, 2019). It is important that the food crisis is addressed in 
order for human security to be achieved. Only then can people be empowered to face risks and 
overcome challenges when their lives are not threatened by malnutrition. As the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation of the UN (FAOUN)  posits, “food security exists when all people, 
at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food 
which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAOUN, 
2016:1). Sometimes, food may be available but it will not be affordable to the people, due to 
high prices and poverty.  
The state of the environment also plays a role in determining whether or not the soil is fertile 
for food cultivation. Therefore, environmental crises also have an impact on food production 
and human security. In order for agricultural produce to be supplied, the nature of the 
environment plays a major. As argued by Akokpari (2007), environmental factors such as 
floods and droughts contribute to food crisis in Africa. When there are floods, agricultural 
produce is unable to thrive because it gets washed away, or the soil becomes too weak to hold 
it in the ground. Worse still, the nutrients of the soil would have been lost and diluted by the 
excess water. On the other hand, during drought seasons the soil becomes too dry to allow 
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plants to grow, which will lead to the killing of the planted seeds. However, when there is a 
balanced environmental state, plants can grow normally, and be cultivated to provide food for 
the people. Unfortunately, in Sub-Saharan Africa and northern parts of Africa, flooding and 
drought, constantly affect agricultural production, which causes food crisis, thus human 
security is not achieved (Akokpari, 2007). Environmental crisis characterised by climate 
change, land degradation, and the mismanagement of natural resources, hamper human security 
(Foster, 2005).  
It is worth noting that environmental challenges such as the foregoing are more prevalent in 
countries affected by conflicts (Conflict and Environmental Observatory, 2019). For example, 
in the case of southern Iraq, water contamination has been a major issue, because of its scarcity 
and mismanagement due to poor administration in the context of war, over 110 000 people 
have been affected (Conflict and Environmental Observatory, 2019). Since 2015, there has 
been record of over 2 000 cases of socio-environmental conflicts, where environmental 
degradation and resource scarcity are causing conflict and forced migration. This makes human 
security challenging to attain because water contamination, climate change, land degradation, 
etc. are factors that violate human rights, which, in some cases, lays the foundation for conflict 
to erupt, and vice versa.  
2.2.4. Terrorism 
The term spans from the word terror, which can be defined as the deliberate use of intimidation, 
violence and fear to further an agenda. Smith gives a more detailed definition of terror as 
“violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm, […] 
designed to coerce others into taking actions they would otherwise not undertake, or to refrain 
from taking actions that they desire to take” (Okumu and Botha, 2009: 85). The definition of 
terrorism is, however, somewhat general, seeing that in some cases, groups fighting for the 
good for the people, for the freedom and rights of the civilians have been labelled as terrorist. 
For example, in South Africa, during the Apartheid era, the African National Congress (ANC) 
party leaders were labelled as terrorists by the Apartheid government and the international 
community, in a bid to silence them, even though they were fighting for the good of the people 
(Waxman, 2018). Also, in the case of the Biafran war, the Nigerian government labelled the 
Biafran fighters as terrorists because they protested against the unequal distribution of the 
country’s oil resources (Akwagyiram, 2017). In essence, leaders have used the term ‘terrorist’ 
to further their own agenda. This is not to deviate from the impact of terrorism on human 
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security. It is a fact that, regardless of the situation, terrorism has caused and continues to cause 
great human insecurity challenges.   
Terrorism usually spans from extremists views, which in most cases, are Islamic extremists, 
that have spiralled into groups willing to go to any lengths to frighten people and/or government 
into doing carrying out the extremists’ goals. Over the years, terrorism has increased within 
states and internationally. Some of the contemporary trends have been classified as state-
sponsored terrorism, meaning that there is increased human insecurity. For example, in 
Afghanistan, counter-terrorism strategies have contributed to the rate at which human 
insecurity is rising (Akopkari, 2007). This is so because the international community’s use of 
military means to fight against militant groups there has led to an increase in civilian casualties, 
seeing that in fighting terrorism, it is difficult to distinguish between those working for and/or 
are terrorist, from mere civilians.   
In cases such as the above cites, the lives of the people become inevitably endangered, not only 
in the hands of the terrorist groups, but also in the hands of those fighting against the terrorists. 
Finally, the adverse effects of terrorism on lives, properties, infrastructure etc., make it difficult 
for people to feel secure.  In most cases, some are forced to migrate, whiles others are forcefully 
displaced from their homes. which in turn increases human insecurity.  
 
In conclusion, conflict and violence, social instability and political actions, and poverty and 
economic instability are core causes of human insecurity. It is important to note that all above 
mentioned causes of human insecurity are interlinked - they all interact with each other. When 
a society is struck by conflict and violence, the level of human security drops drastically. For 
instance: people are displaced from their homes, many are subjected to suffering, women and 
girls are raped as a weapon of war, and some children are forcefully abducted and trained to 
become child soldiers. In addition to the aforementioned negative effects, people stop trusting 
the system, fear increases, and their freedoms or rights are taken or lost in the process. Just as 
conflict causes displacement, suffering and the creation of child soldiers, it also leads to 
increased rates of poverty and economic instability which then leads to human insecurity.   
Poverty rates tend to increase in conflict ridden areas; the economic stability of states in conflict 
becomes volatile and unstable – the conflict persists. Finally, political actions and social 
instability cause and exacerbate conflict. Most conflicts emanate from: political rivalry (for 
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power and status), as well as bad governance and political decisions which inspire rebellion or 
revolt. Further to that due to social injustice, conflict may erupt. Terrorism is one of the major 
causes of human insecurity because of its goal of implanting fear and forcefully causing people 
to give up their human rights in the society, in order to forge the goals of the terrorist groups. 
2.3. Human (In)Security in Nigeria 
Since the independence of Nigeria, insecurity has been an issue, where different governments 
have tried to prioritize security of the country, however, have not been as successful as 
expected. With the different threats to Nigeria’s security, Boko Haram stands at its centre, 
where its activities are further threatening security of the people and the country at large. As 
Kalu, et al (2018) argues in their article, human security in Nigeria spans from problems like 
the militancy in the Niger-Delta, rampaging kidnaping in the South-east, armed robbery, ritual 
killings and Boko Haram insurgencies, of which the later continues to pose severe human 
security threat to the country. This section aims to interrogate the conceptual framework of 
human security in the Nigerian context, with specific focus on economic security, food 
security, and political security. Nigeria continues to suffer from human insecurity, which spans 
from food, environmental, health, political, personal, community, and economic security. 
However, for the purpose of this section, only three will be discussed.  
As discussed above, economic security is the provision of economic needs of the people, which 
entrains employment security, in order for them to have a source of income to fend for 
themselves and their family. In Nigeria, however, economic security is far from being attained, 
and this remains one of the most security difficulties that is vexing the people. This is contrary 
to the global record that Nigeria is the economic giant of Africa, where it is believed that it is 
enriched in its economic strength (Kalu, et al, 2018; Otolorin, 2017). In reality, the people are 
staved of employment, which affects their ability to economically cater for themselves, and 
government does little to nothing in making sure its citizens are cared for. As have been argued 
by Kayode, et al (2014), the country’s wealth is concentrated on the top 10% elites, whiles the 
other 90% suffer the stings of economic instability. This disparity and economic insecurity in 
Nigeria continues to affect the country’s growth and development, and further open up the 
country to other forms of insecurities, internally and externally. And, as of 2019, Nigeria was 
declared one of the African countries with fast growing poverty rate (United Nations, 2019), 
which further supports the argument that it is unable to provide its people with economic 
security. Economic insecurity in Nigeria plays a major role in the emergence of insurgent 
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groups, and the continued surge of conflict in the country. With rising poverty in the country, 
food insecurity has become another major issue depriving the attainment of human security in 
Nigeria. 
According to UNDP (1994), having physical and economic access to food and a balanced diet 
brings about food security, unfortunately, Nigeria is lacking in this regard. Agricultural 
production is one of the country’s major source of revenue, which amounts to about 40% of its 
GPD (FAOUN, 2020). Even though the country ranks 93rd out of 117 countries on the Global 
Hunger Index in 2019 (Global Hunger Index, 2019), the figures are disappointing considering 
the fact that one of the country’s major source of revenue is agriculture. This increasing hunger 
rates can be attributed to the perpetual violence that the country continues to face over the 
years.  
Food insecurity is usually a result of armed violence and forced displacement, while some are 
due to lost incomes or depletion of household savings (United Nations, 2019). Of which in the 
case of Nigeria, one can argue that it is mostly due to violent conflict, forced displacement and 
loss of income. Since the gaining of independence, Nigeria has witnessed several violent 
conflicts, which have affected it supply and access to food. From religious and ethnic conflicts, 
to disasters, such as flooding and droughts, to economic crisis (Otaha, 2013), all these have 
contributed to the rising food insecurity in Nigeria. And, to top it up, over the years, the 
country’s focus on food production has shifted to oil production and more importation of food, 
which has further made cost of food to rise, thus making it more difficult for the people to 
access basic balanced diets (Otaha, 2013). While food insecurity in Nigeria continues to 
negatively affect human security in the country, political insecurity also stands at the heart of 
it. 
For decades, Nigeria has been known for its constant political unrest, which ranges from ethnic 
and religious conflicts, kidnapping, violent rebel activities, rigging of votes, political conflicts, 
etc. These unrests have caused devastating political instability in the country, and to top it all, 
there is the emergence of Boko Haram and other violent insurgent groups (Otaha, 2013). As 
known, that the concept of political security is to have the freedom to hold personal political 
views, ideologies, parties and freedom to express those views (UNDP, 1994), this is, 
unfortunately, not the case in Nigeria. Political unrest in the country has made it difficult for 
the people to freely hold political views which are not influenced or enforced by political elites. 
In most cases, violence is used to supress people from freely expressing and making 
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independent political decisions. This is constantly seen in the continued violence that the 
country experiences during elections. Where people are violently threatened to vote against 
their choice of candidate, and/or people being threatened from going to vote, votes getting 
burned up and even people getting killed in the process (Adibe, 2014). Political violence in 
Nigeria has become a constant occurrence, and a breeding ground for violent insurgent groups 
to emerge. With political violence at the frontline of Nigeria’s conflict situation, political 
insecurity will continue until something is done about it.  
To summarize, it is important to note that, all the factors in human security contribute to the 
insecurity state in Nigeria, however, for the purpose of this study, only the above mentioned 
factors are discussed. All factors of human security are intertwined, so does economic, food 
and political security, in the Nigerian context. This being that, economic security is needed for 
food security to be achieved. While, the lack of political stability tends to negatively affect 
economic and food security. To have access to adequate food, the Nigerian people need to have 
the economic means to do so, like employment and sources of income, and to have these, 
freedom of political views and ideologies are necessary. As such, in the absence of all these, 
human insecurity continues to be in the rise.  
2.4. Debates around Human Security 
The term human security is one which has sparked a spate of debates over the years, with most 
questioning its clarity due to its abstract and imprecise nature. Although some have argued that 
it is forward-thinking, synergistic and adaptable to the work of the United Nations (UNDP, 
2005), others believe it is too abstract and not relevant, hence it needs to be more specific and 
direct (John, 2014; Khong, 2001; Paris, 2001). This section will discuss key debates about the 
concept by focusing on its ambiguity, misuse by political leaders, and its relevance. It is 
noteworthy that, on the other hand, there is the argument that it provides a holistic approach to 
security.  
The ambiguity of human security can be likened to that of ‘sustainable development’, where, 
although everyone seems to be for it, few actually understand what it means, while very few 
people know how to achieve it (Paris, 2001; John, 2014). The term can be argued to be 
analytically weak, seeing that it hardly gives a good analysis of an event within its scope, and 
many political leaders do not understand what it entails. For example, the former special 
representative to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti, and the chair of the UN Panel on Peacekeeping, 
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Lakhdar Brahimi, once mentioned that he did not use the word, ‘human security’, because he 
does not know what it exactly means and worries that someone might contradict him without 
him being able to support his understanding (John, 2014). Also, the fact that human security 
encompasses everything, it becomes difficult to distinguish anything. As argued by Khong 
(2001) and Paris (2001), nothing will be done, as there is not a particular aspect of focus. For 
Paris (2001), the concept is too inclusive and expansive, such that it makes room for irregular 
discomforts. Also, it will be difficult for policy-makers to allocate resources across all seven 
broad aspects of human security. Seeing that they overlap, the already scarce resources will 
further incur allocation problems (Khong, 2001).  
Also, some other critiques have argued that human security has only been used by political 
leaders to further their own political agenda, within the international community (John, 2014; 
Paris, 2001). Political leaders use the term human security in a bid to win international 
recognition, status and power, as well as to entice private aid and development agencies which 
advance human security interests (Paris, 2001). Also, these leaders perceive the provision of 
human security as a competition in the international community. In the process of doing that, 
those who are really marginalized and in need of  human security are further marginalized and 
excluded from the equation. In the process of furthering their own interests, the concept leads 
to the disempowering of already weak and underdeveloped states (Duffield and Waddell, 
2004). In terms of development and security, there is a division between the states that are able 
to provide their people with human security (developed states) and those that are unable to do 
so (undeveloped states). When powerful states are able to freely intervene in smaller or weaker 
states, this disempowers the latter and its citizens, seeing that they are unable to hold the former 
to account, for the violation of human rights during the times they were providing ‘human 
security’ vis-à-vis ‘intervention’ (John, 2014).  
The usefulness of the concept of human security is heavily contested. To begin with, the 
researcher questions the notion behind using human beings solely as the symbol of security. 
This is because the actions and personality of human beings are constantly changing, as such, 
this uncertainty affects the ability for a fixed application of human security to be implemented. 
So, how useful is a concept which is based on uncertain and constantly changing group? The 
usefulness of human security in academic research, is contested by Paris (2001) who contends 
that the concept is young and subject to change because what is considered a security threat 
now, might not be the same in the near future. On the other hand (Henk, 2005:91) questioned 
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the usefulness of human security by enquiring how a concept still so undefined and contested, 
could really have much utility. Although the author argues in favour of human security, his 
question remains a point of critique, inspiring debates amongst scholars and analysts alike, 
particularly those who do not consider it relevant or useful.   
On the other hand, there is a key argument that seems to support the concept of human security. 
The supposition is that, the utility of the concept is “to broaden our understanding of security 
beyond the narrow military-related agenda emphasised by traditional approaches to security” 
(Ewen, 2007:183). For instance, the phrase ‘freedom from want’ has added a non-military, 
physical issue to the agenda of human security, because the word ‘want’ encompasses issues 
such as poverty, underdevelopment and disease. As such, human security becomes focused 
directly on people, unlike how the subject of security used to be focused on the military and 
states. The people-centred concept suggests that security should focus on the social 
development of the people; not just on military concerns, but also on economic and political 
aspects.  
 
In addition, unlike the critics who argue that the human security aspects are too broad, 
proponents of human security argue rather, that the adding of the seven components of human 
security make it more inclusive and human based. Hence the needs of people are catered for 
on the basis of food, environment, health, personal, political, community and economic 
security (UNDP, 1994). Thus, human security is more holistic and people-centred. Ewen 
(2007) argues that human security does not only provide a holistic approach to security issues, 
it also draws on “different specialisms, together in the quest to understand better the 
interconnections between diverse aspects of human insecurity, and it may also bolster co-
operation between international agencies in the fields of security, development and human 
rights” (Ewen, 2007:184).  
 
In conclusion, although the concept of human security came with the intention to further human 
development and growth, it is important to note the great amount of scepticism accompanying 
its conceptualisation. It is evident that human security focuses on the people, as compared to 
the state. However, the fact that the state remains the guarantor must not be neglected; it still 
holds high power over the security of the people. Furthermore, as earlier discussed, states can 
use the human security concept to further their own self-interests thus creating more problems,  
especially when weaker states continue to be exploited to benefit of powerful states. The 
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adoption of human security has so far not reflected much of a positive impact in terms of 
changing the behaviour of states; nor has it influenced major positive effects on the lives of the 
most vulnerable, whom the concept should be aiding. This is not to say human security is of 




Boko Haram in Nigeria 
 
Religious extremism has always brought about violence in the society. People tend to go to any 
lengths to defend their religious beliefs, which has led to wars in the past. Furthermore, 
extremist groups may end up terrorising people. In the case of Nigeria, religious extremism 
manifested itself in the ‘holy war’ which was led by Usman dan Fodio in 1804 (Harvard 
Divinity School, 2019), inspired the creation of Boko Haram, and has led to countless small 
religious conflicts over the years. Boko Haram started off as a charity group before developing 
into a terrorist group, as was described by the international community post 2009. The sect 
claims to have been sent by its god, to purge the society of western education and interference. 
Since its violent emergence in 2009, Boko Haram has embarked on countless bloody attacks 
in the country, especially in the norther part. This chapter discusses how the jihadist group was 
formed, the different insurgencies it has launched and what the government of Nigeria has been 
doing to counter the sect’s attacks. The emergence of Boko Haram remains a controversial 
topic in contemporary history.  
 
3.1. Emergence of Boko Haram 
There are many controversial explanations of how Boko Haram emerged in northern Nigeria. 
Although this article focuses more on the narrative that the sect began as a charity group, it 
briefly outlines the political conspiracy narratives, amongst many other narratives.  
 
One of the many narratives on Boko Haram’s emergence is the political conspiracy (Adibe, 
2014). In this narrative, some have argued that the group was created by politicians who were 
against former president, Goodluck Jonathan’s rule. These group of thinkers believe that some 
northern politicians sponsored the creation of the Boko Haram group in the northern part of the 
country, to disrupt president Jonathan’s administration (Egbeleke, 2013). After the sudden 
death of former president Yar’Adua in 2010, Jonathan took over as president, before he was 
democratically elected in 2011. With the ethnic and religious dynamics of the country, 
Jonathan being a Christian and a southerner, northern politicians were said to be against his 
rule because they considered the ruling of the country to be their birth right (Adibe, 2014). As 
such, they planned with some youths, sponsored them to terrorise the people, while the 
politicians often cited the attacks as a portrayal of President Jonathan’s inability to run the 
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country (Hasan, 2017). The group grew stronger, making them now difficult to defeat. This 
argument would have been accurate if Boko Haram began its insurgency from 2010, after 
president Jonathan came into power but the sect has been in operation since 2002, which does 
not align with former president Jonathan’s tenure.  
 
Another view is that, Jonathan sponsored Boko Haram in order to either mobilise support from 
Christians and Southerners, or to make sure that the sect’s insurgency weakened and de-
populated the northern part of the country ahead the 2015 elections (Adibe, 2014). This 
narrative suggests that Jonathan sponsored Boko Haram in order to make Islam look bad, and 
to make sure that by the time the 2015 election was undertaken, the population in the north 
would have reduced. This is because, during elections, the votes from the northerners are 
usually high, and they tend to support any northern candidate. So, if their population had 
reduced by then, it meant that president Jonathan had a better chance of winning against Buhari, 
who is a northerner. Unfortunately, Boko Haram’s insurgency did not have any positive effect 
on Jonathan’s administration nor his 2015 election performance, seeing that Buhari defeated 
him by 2.5 million votes (BBC News, 2015). Noteworthy is that Boko Haram has not been able 
to destroy the image of Islam because some of its insurgents target fellow Muslims. Thus one 
ponders the question of what could be their real agenda, considering the fact that they are 
attacking people regardless of their ethnic and religious backgrounds? Unfortunately, 
foregoing arguments do not correspond with either the activities of or the timing of creation of 
Boko Haram. Furthermore, there is not enough evidence to support the claims, which made it 
difficult to assert or apply them to this study. As such, this thesis argues from a historical 
perspective of the emergence of Boko Haram.    
 
Boko Haram was initially created as a charity group in the northern part of Nigeria (Shuaibu 
& Salleh, 2015). The group’s aim was to spreading Islamic teachings, while providing the 
people with arms, specifically those who listened to their preaching. However, it gradually 
developed into a violent group, which believed that Islamic culture is the superior religion, thus 
should be embraced by all (Kagu et al, 2019). The group also believes that western education 
is a sin, and should be abolished from the country. This section details the development of the 




Boko Haram was once referred to as Yusuffiya, named after its founder, Mohammed Yusuf. It 
was established in its hold in Borno state in1992, but only became popular from 2001 (Bintube, 
2015). In the 1990s, there was a group called the Izalatulbidi’awaikamatul sunna, of which 
Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, was a member of. Yusuf was considered one of the 
extremists of the group. He had suggested that the group embarked on a jihad to purge the 
‘unholy’ people, but the suggestions was rejected by the group (Bintube, 2015). As a result, he 
led a breakaway from the group, taking with him those who agreed with his beliefs to form 
what is now known as the Boko Haram group. Although the sect started off as a charity, non-
violent group, it is arguable that it always had violent intentions, seeing that the founder was 
an extremist who wanted to launch a jihad in the northern part of Nigeria. Also, it is safe to say 
that its launch of charity arms was a strategy for recruiting people before actually launching its 
violent intentions. 
After leaving the Izalatulbidi’awaikamatul sunna sect, Yusuf targeted youths who were 
socially excluded, unemployed and deprived in the society, seeing that they were easier to 
indoctrinate and manipulate (Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015). The group was able to use the socio-
economic disadvantage of northern Nigeria to its benefit. It is important to note that the 
economic gap between the southern and northern part of the country is wide, where by 2018 
there was about 27% poverty gap between both regions (Dapel, 2018). As such, the jihadist 
group was able to use this to their advantage, recruiting young members because of their 
extremely low level of education and unemployment (Addaney, 2016). So to them, joining the 
group meant a way out of unemployment and poverty.    
The group changed its name from Yusuffiya to ahalulsunnahwaljamahijirah, and then 
withdrew from society to go underground where it trained and launched mini, non-significant 
attacks on police stations in the area. It also created a base in the Kannamma village of Yobe 
state. During this time, the group was not yet known, nationally; in fact, it was only known in 
the village, and was not considered a threat then (Bintube, 2015). This, however, gradually 
changed when, in 2002, things took a turn around for the group. 
By 2002, the group had changed its name to Boko Haram, which means ‘western education is 
forbidden’, and it began to actively launch attacks on the people (Addaney, 2016). Also, for 
them, ‘western education’ reminds them of how the colonial masters used education to cause 
divisions amongst the northers. The aristocratic class were allowed to have access to it, while 
the commoner classes were excluded, thus yielding animosity and distrust between 
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traditionally educated commoners and western-educated elites (Perouse de Montclos, 2016). It 
was the distrust and divide that the group used to its advantage, and this is reflected in its 
insurgency; it attacks those within the privileged sector of western education. As opined by 
Kagu et.al. (2019), the introduction of the western education system in Nigeria, brought about 
the ‘upgrading’ and/or shift away from the country’s basic values, to a more globalised 
knowledge system. However, for Yusuf, this was considered a ‘sin’ because of the division it 
caused in the society. Due to British rule, the western style of education provided opportunities 
for the people to be enlightened, and not to be easily manipulated, which, for the jihadist group, 
meant it was not going to be able to establish a conservative Islamic environment in the region. 
With the few recruits the group had, in December 2003, it started launching open attacks on 
government buildings and police stations, continuing to wreak havoc on small communities 
like Yunusari, Borsari, Damaturu, Tarmuwa and Geidam in Yobe state (Perouse de Montclos, 
2016; Addaney, 2016). With its violent acts becoming unbearable, the government had to 
intervene, leading the group to go into hiding, only to resurface even stronger and angrier in 
2005. Between 2005 and 2009, the group continued to launch small attacks on the people. 
However, the 2009 attacks marked a major turning point of the group. 
Finally, in 2009, the Nigerian security forces and Boko Haram clashed, after the jihadist group 
had returned from its hiding, and Yusuf, the founder, had returned from self-imposed exile in 
Saudi Arabia (Addaney, 2016; Comolli, 2015). Due to the countless small attacks that the 
group were launching on the government, the police were employed to confront the group and 
this confrontation led to a deadly conflict which led to the arrest of Yusuf, in 2009, and his 
killing in 2010 (Campbell, 2014; Comolli, 2015; Addaney, 2016). Yusuf’s death caused a huge 
outcry from the group which then withdrew to regroup and strengthen themselves, and returned 
in 2010. After Yusuf’s death, the police paraded his body on national TV, and the government 
publicly celebrated victory over the jihadist group, not knowing that it was regrouping to come 
back far worse than it had been before.  
3.2. The Boko Haram insurgency 
As already stated, Boko Haram started off as a charity non-violent group, that was looking out 
for the welfare of the people in the society. However, it gradually evolved into a violent group, 
turning into a full grown insurgent group in Nigeria.  
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The killing of Yusuf in 2010 was a major blunder, but the government, not knowing this, 
celebrated it as a victory. It is common knowledge that, killing a terrorist leader does not end 
terrorism. Rather, it produces angrier followers who are willing to go any lengths just to 
retaliate. Such was the case with Yusuf; after he was arrested, he confidently boasted of the 
plans the group had and that they would execute them, with or without him (Akinola, 2015) 
and that is exactly what happened. In the same year, the group started re-grouping, re-
strategizing, and increase in membership. It also embarked on its first successful prison break 
in Bauchi.  More than 700 prisoners were freed, and made to join the group, which led to the 
drastic increase in its membership (Shuaibu, et.al, 2015).  
 
Also, not less than a month after Yusuf was killed, the jihadist group chose another leader, 
Abubakar Shekau (Akinola, 2015). Shekau published an interview where he outlined the new 
direction of the group and listed the demands the group wanted from the government. That 
particular step officially launched the group into full scale violent attacks, attracting 
widespread attention nationally and from the international community, which when alerted 
defined Boko Haram as a terrorist group. In addition to the prison break, the group tried to 
exhibit their power by carrying out another attack in 2011. It targeted the United Nations (UN) 
headquarters in Abuja, where it launched a vehicle-borne IED explosion (Thurston, 2017). The 
attack resulted in the death of more than 15 individuals, with countless injured, most of them 
being staff members and civilians (Adelaja and George, 2019). Ladbury et al. (2016) stated 
that, in order to reduce the impact of Boko Haram’s attacking tendencies, the Unite States (US) 
and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) planned to sit down for negotiations with them. 
However, at that time, the popular argument was tha, Boko Haram was already gaining the 
support of al-Qaeda, from Niger, where it had already gained some control (Ladbury et al., 
2016). The group was bent on getting revenge on the government for the death of their founder, 
so this intensified their insurgency. Azumah (2015) stated that, after the death of Yusuf the 
only motto of Boko Haram was not to make the religion pure but also to take revenge for the 
killing of Yusuf by the militants.  
 
In 2012, the group launched another attack which took over 100 lives in Kano state (Oboh, 
2012). This particular attack is one of the deadliest attacks the group has ever launched in the 
country. In the spirit of the New Year, the people of Kano state did not know what was coming. 
As such, noone was prepared for the attack, which is why its impact was huge. The jihadist 
group detonated several bombs and opened fire on people, in large commercial places, 
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hospitals and police stations (Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015; Oboh, 2012). Similarly, in 2014, 
suicide bombers were deployed to bomb police stations, marketplaces, places of worship, and 
hospitals in Kano again. It was also reported that a ten year old girl would have detonated a 
bomb she was wearing, in Kastina, if she was not discovered early enough. The jihadist group 
used young girls in this particular attack, which showed the extreme lengths it was willing to 
go, just to terrorise the people. Also, in the attack, the sect opened fire on worshipers who were 
said to be Muslims, at the mosque (Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015). This raised the question of what 
and who exactly their fight is against? Seeing that it attacks people from its own religious 
group. Finally, the 2012 and 2014 attacks led to the deaths of over 200 people, with over 300 
being injured (Nicholas, 2014). Not knowing exactly where the bombs were coming from, 
people scattered everywhere, as they ran for safety. The girls that were used in the 2014 suicide 
bombings were some of the girls the jihadist group had kidnapped earlier that year.  
 
In 2013, due to the increasing insurgence of the group, the government declared a state of 
emergency in the affected states of Yobe, Adamawa and Borno, in order to curb the attacks 
(Blanchard, 2014). However, this only made the attacks worse because between 2013 and 
2014, the sect’s insurgency had taken over 5000 lives. In 2014, the sect changed its strategy 
and started kidnapping children, women, religious leaders, etc. (Bintube, 2015; Shuaibu and 
Salleh, 2015).  
 
Bombing is one of Boko Haram’s major insurgent tactics; it has undertaken countless 
bombings of villages, schools, government buildings, commercial institutions, worship centres 
etc. There are also records of them bombing churches and mosques. In 2018, the group bombed 
a catholic church in Kaya, Madagali, in Adamawa state, during an attack on the village, by the 
insurgent group (Catholic News Agency, 2018). The catholic church was one of the over 20 
buildings that were bombed by the group on the day. The Nigerian security forces were able to 
intervene, even though their intervention was already late. One of the Boko Haram members 
was killed in the intervention.  
 
The group had embarked on a kidnapping spree, where political and religious leaders were 
kidnapped. Some were never seen again, while others returned after the payment of ransom 
(Akinbi, 2015; Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015). However, in 2014, the group undertook a major 
kidnapping which left the whole world shocked, and till date, the kidnapped girls are all yet to 
be returned. On the 14th of April 2014, the group stormed a girls school in Chibok, Borno state, 
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and kidnapped nearly 300 school girls from a government school (BBC News, 2017; Mbah, 
2019; Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015). The schoolgirls were forcefully loaded onto a truck which 
the jihadist group drove away on the night of the incident. Not even the presence of school 
teachers could stop the group from executing their plan. It is sad to say that, till date, 112 girls 
are yet to be returned by the sect, and the government seems to have given up on its promise 
to make sure the girls are returned. Just like the 2014 kidnapping, the jihadist group carried out 
another one in 2018, in Dapchi town (Signe, 2018) where over 100 girls were kidnapped from 
their school. 
 
In 2015 the group launched another attack in Baga, in Borno state. The attack was a deadly 
massacre, which led to the deaths of over 2000 people (Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015). The group 
captured and seized a military base in northern Nigeria, and embarked on a killing spree, 
resulting in the most deadly massacre ever recorded in the sect’s insurgency. The Nigerian 
security forces did not seem to learn from the attack, because in 2018, a similar attack was 
carried out at the army bases in northeast Nigeria (Campbell, 2018). In mid-November 2018, 
the jihadist group attacked a military base in Metele, killing over a hundred soldiers and looting 
their weapons, food and clothing. Neither the government nor the military forces were able to 
launch a counter the attack. The attack came as a surprise because the main report on the case 
came from the videos that soldiers who had survived it recorded and circulated. The general 
public was made aware of the incident only through the videos that were posted on social 
media. Again, Boko Haram had demonstrated its growing strength, suggesting that it is now 
more unlikely to be defeated by the national security force of Nigeria.  
 
Again, in June 2019, another attack was launched by Boko Haram, on the Nigerian army, in 
Borno state (BusinessDay News, 2019). The sect launched an attack on the military bases in 
Borno state, where they successfully seized three military personnel and stole weapons. This 
operation was conducted from the 31st of May to the 2nd of June. The three-day attack was 
carried out in four different military bases in the northeast of Nigeria (SABCNews, 2019). On 
the Friday of the attack, the sect stormed a military base in the town of Dikwa, but was 
unsuccessful in taking over the base, as they were repelled by the army (Business Day News, 
2019). In a similar fashion, they attacked another military base in the town of Marte, on 
Saturday, where they were able to take over. In an intensive fight, Boko Haram successfully 
pushed out the troops from the base, and took over their weapons (Press TV News, 2019). After 
ransacking the place, they stole all their weapons, and then set the place on fire, making it 
 32 
difficult for the soldiers to return. In their third attack, Boko Haram attacked a base in Kirenowa 
village where they stole weapons and forced the soldiers to evacuate before going into hiding 
in Dikwa (Business Day News, 2019).  
 
Finally, from their hiding in Lake Chad, another attack was launched on another military base 
in Dalwa village, on Sunday 2nd of June (SABCNews, 2019). Since the emergence of Boko 
Haram, one of their strategies is to attack military bases in the northeast part of the country. In 
all attacks, the Nigerian soldiers were not able to defend themselves against the sect because 
they lacked adequate skills and strategies to challenge Boko Haram.  
 
To conclude, Boko Haram’s insurgency has led to the deaths of countless people, and many 
have been displaced, injured/disabled in the attacks. Furthermore, the security of the country 
has been highly compromised by acts and threats of terror. Since its violent emergency in 2002, 
it has plunged the country into instability, and has greatly affected human security.  
 
3.3. Government response to the Boko Haram insurgency  
As Yusuf (2019) stated, the random, yet consistent attacks by Boko Haram on the people have 
led to high tensions and brought about threats to safety in the country. To address the issues, 
the government took some initiative in trying to suppress the growth of Boko Haram. However, 
the initiatives have been unable to control or defeat the jihadist group. Over the years, the 
government has tried the following, in their bid to defeat and/or control the jihadist group: re-
allocation of financial budget for military upgrades, dialogue and declaring states of 
emergency, calling for international assistance, and military expedition.  
 
One of the first approaches the government tried to use to end the Boko Haram insurgency, 
was to suggest dialogue, but this was unsuccessful (Akinbi, 2015). During former president 
Jonathan’s tenure, he called upon the leader of the sect, and asked for a scheduled date to meet 
for negotiations. Jonathan even promised to provide amnesty to all Boko Haram members if 
they willingly laid down their arms (Akinbi, 2015). This particular government intervention 
was already foreseen to be ineffective because negotiating with terrorists has never been a good 
idea. While in the case of Boko Haram, agreeing to lay down their arms would have led to 
greater challenges, seeing that the group had multiple identities, and seemed to easily change 
its leadership. In the words of Akinbi, (2015:42), that would have made “rapprochement 
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elusive”. Since dialogue never worked out, the Nigerian government embarked on other, more 
aggressive, interventions. As dialogue never worked for the government, from 2012 to end of 
2013, the government decided to call for a state of emergency (Akinbi, 2015; Blanchard, 2014). 
Still under the administration of president Jonathan, a state of emergency was declared in 
Borno in early 2012. It was then extended to Adamawa and Yobe states in 2013. The state of 
emergency was established in order to control and/or limit the impact of the jihadist group on 
the people. However, that did not make much of a difference because the group continued to 
carry out attacks in the region thus more lives were lost.  
 
Furthermore, the Nigerian government has increased its financial efforts to combat the jihadist 
group. In 2014, the government increased the national military budget spending, which made 
it possible for the military to purchase more weapons, armoured vehicles, and other needed 
counter-terrorist materials (Aghedo and Osumah, 2015). The increase of funds was inspired by 
Boko Haram’s kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls. The government was made to realize that 
the group would go to any lengths to terrorise the people. Also, the international attention 
surrounding the kidnappings forced the government to intensify its intervention. Unfortunately, 
even after the increased military funding, the national security force was still unable to stand 
against the jihadist group. The military still had no chance against Boko Haram due to the 
misuse of the funds. There was lack of support to buy the needed weapons, more than 50% of 
the funds budgeted for the national security force were not accounted for and political leaders 
in charge of the funds rather used it for their own interests (Ogbuehl, 2018; Aghedo and 
Osumah, 2015). This has not only made it difficult for the government to defeat the jihadist 
group, but also caused many soldiers to lose their lives during fight against Boko Haram.  
 
Although there is the worry of misuse of funds, Ogunnubi (2019) has argued that the Nigerian 
government has made some progress in the fight against Boko Haram. The government has 
employed over a hundred more people into the national security force and in 2018 it approved 
over 1million US dollars (USD) budget for the improvement of the national defence system 
(Ogunnubi, 2019). After the Dapchi kidnapping of schoolgirls, the government saw another 
need for increase in funds for the fight against Boko Haram. Also, military personnel sent to 
fight against the jihadist group have complained that they are no match for the group, seeing 
that the sect is better equipped than the security force. Ten years have passed since the violent 
emergence of the group in 2008, yet the Nigerian security force has not been able to acquire 
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military materials and devise strategies needed to combat the jihadist group even with all the 
international assistance that has been coming into the country.  
 
The government of Nigeria has also been able to respond to the Boko Haram insurgency by 
calling for international assistance. After the Chibok incident, which drew international 
attention, the US, under the auspice of the United Nations (UN) also intervened in the matter 
(Amusan and Ejoke, 2017). The US provided the Nigerian government with experts to help 
train military personnel on counter-terrorist attacks. The US was also able to provide the 
government with financial aid to help enhance its technological skills and adequately cater for 
the soldiers fighting against the jihadist group (Addaney, 2016). This is because, it was 
believed that the soldiers were not able to fight well due to the lack of adequate care, which 
was affecting their stability and focus. Although the US’s intervention brought about some 
hope for the Nigerian people, the jihadist group seemed to be more than prepared, as their 
insurgency neither reduced nor stopped following US counter-terrorism assistance. As Salisu 
and Saleh (2019) argued, the performance and thinking process of Boko Haram is quite 
advanced. As such, the only way to defeat them is not through the acquisition of advanced 
weaponries, but rather, by understanding how it thinks. Of which their argument was proven 
true, because when the US was assisting the Nigerian government to help defeat the jihadist 
group, the group was busy re-strategizing. Boko Haram was developing their networks, and 
devising ways to destroy the communication system of the country, in order to decentralise the 
system and make its attacks easier (Suleiman and Aminul Karim 2015). This was seen in their 
subsequent bombings and attempted attacks on government facilities, commercial businesses 
and police stations, especially in the Kano attack of 2014.  
 
In addition to the US’ intervention, the governments of Chad, Cameroon, Benin and Niger also 
decided to intervene in the fight against Boko Haram, as the insurgent group was extending 
into their boarders (Stevenson et al, 2017). In order to assist, they contributed military 
personnel, over 3000 military personnel were sent to Nigeria to fight against the jihadist group. 
Also, Cameroon, Chad and Niger provided their territory for the housing of displaced people 
affected by the insurgency (Omole, et.al., 2015). Over hundred thousand people have been 
displaced by the insurgency which has led to the increasing rate of refugees fleeing the country. 
With the influx of refugees into those countries, Boko Haram began to spread, as some of its 
members penetrate into those territories disguised as refugees, to attack and disrupt the refugee 
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camps. This has resulted in the government of Cameroon deciding to return some refugees 
back to Nigeria.  
 
The United Kingdom (UK) also joined in assisting the Nigerian government to fight the Boko 
Haram insurgency. In 2017, the UK government provided financial support for soldiers’ skills 
development and counter-terrorism training (Stevenson et al, 2017). It gave financial aid of 
over two hundred and fifty million dollars, and sent forty British troops to join the Nigerian 
soldiers in direct combat with Boko Haram (Stevenson et al, 2017). Other countries that 
assisted were China, which provided technological assistant and Canada, which provided 
experts (Sampson, 2016; Stevenson et al, 2017). International assistance has afforded the 
Nigerian government some advantage in the fight against Boko Haram. It has not defeated the 
group, but has provided hope for the government of Nigeria.  
 
Another way the Nigerian government has been responding to the Boko Haram insurgency is 
through military expedition. The government’s main response to Boko Haram is by waging 
military war against the group. Even before the group became actively violent in 2009, the 
government has always used military means to fight the group (Akinbi, 2015; Addaney, 2016). 
Since the Jonathan administration, Nigerian soldiers have always been sent to wage fights 
against the jihadist group. In 2009, Nigerian military personnel clashed with the group, leading 
to the killing of over hundred Boko Haram members and the capturing of the sect’s founder, 
Yusuf (Shuaibu & Salleh, 2015). That particular military expedition made the government 
believe that it had defeated the jihadist group, yet this made the jihadists even angrier and 
stronger. With small scale military expeditions, by the Nigerian security force, against Boko 
Haram in 2015, after the election into power of Muhammadu Buhari, the headquarters of the 
military was moved from Abuja to Maiduguri, and the appointment of new military leadership 
was implemented (Felter, 2018). This was in order to make the military more efficient in its 
fight against the jihadist group. Also, seeing that Boko Haram’s hideout base is in Sambisa 
forest, Nigerian soldiers have waged fights against them countless times in the forest. In April 
2019, the Nigerian Air Force attacked the jihadist group in the Bula Korege area of the forest, 
in Borno state (Aluko, 2019). It was claimed that the jihadist group was holding a meeting in 
the forest when the bombing happened. According to the chief officer of the attack, the attack 
led to the killing of over hundred members of the group, with some of the sect’s vehicles and 
weapons being destroyed (Aluko, 2019; NAF Aircraft Destroys Vehicles, Neutralizes 
Terrorists at Suspected Workshop in Sambisa Forest, 2019). This was similar to the 2016 
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Sambisa forest military expedition by the Nigerian security force, which also led to the killing 
of Boko Haram members in the forest.  
 
Finally, on the 10th of June, 2019, a report was released by  the army director of public relations, 
Colonel Sagir Musa, indicating that nine Boko Haram social media influencers had been killed 
(Yusuf, 2019; Toromade, 2019). The director claimed that the army rounded up the sect’s 
media personnel, who were running the group’s media platform, which is used to recruit new 
members and spread the group’s doctrine. Although this was a success for the Nigerian security 
force, it is also safe to question the significance of the killing of those members. This is because 
the Nigerian government has been known to exaggerate the success and impact its interventions 
in dealing with Boko Haram insurgency.  
 
To conclude, although the Nigerian government has made some progress with the fight against 
Boko Haram, it has however not been able to defeat or end the group’s insurgency in the 
country. With the help of other countries, the country has been able to hold back the jihadist 
group from total control of the northern part of Nigeria. The government’s responses to Boko 
Haram’s insurgency have been through increasing the military financial budget, requesting for 
dialogue with the jihadist group, declaring states of emergency, calling for international 
assistance and military expedition. During the early days of incumbent president, Muhammadu 
Buhari’s first term (2015-2018), he emphasised that defeating Boko Haram was part of his 
mandate. However, he failed to deliver on that promise. Seeing that the government has paid 
little to no attention to the recent insurgence of the jihadist group, the latter is gaining more 




Implications of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, Boko Haram insurgency has evolved over the years, by 
becoming more radical and dangerous. The sect’s insurgency continues to cause havoc, 
especially in the northern part of the country. Living standards have dropped drastically, and 
people have lost their properties, their loved ones, and human security in general. Northern 
Nigeria is now considered one of the most unsafe and economically disadvantaged parts of 
Nigeria (Familusi, 2019). The continued bombings and attacks by Boko Haram have had 
negative socio-economic and political implications. On that note, this chapter will focus 
extensively on the socio-economic and political implications of the Boko Haram insurgency. 
The socio-economic and political effects that will be addressed in this chapter, include: poverty 
and illiteracy, unemployment, poor healthcare, displacement, national insecurity, corruption 
and political instability.  
 
4.1. Socio-economic Implications 
Since Boko Haram became violent, more than 9 years ago, the Nigerian government is yet to 
successfully defeat the group and provide adequate protection for its people, against its attacks. 
Boko Haram’s continued insurgency is making it difficult for the country to recover socially 
and economically from past damages. The Nigerian people no longer feel safe in their own 
country, especially those living in the northern part. The sect’s terror attacks, which include: 
kidnappings, bombings, looting, and killing of people, continue to cost the country, and the 
socio-economic state of the northern people has dropped drastically (Awojobi, 2014; Dele, 
2018). For this study, the discussion of the socio-economic implications of Boko Haram 
insurgency in Nigeria will be based on the following issues: poverty and illiteracy, 
unemployment, poor healthcare and displacement of the north-east people of Nigeria.  
 
4.1.1. Poverty and Illiteracy  
To begin with, a brief definition will aid in understanding in this section. Poverty is derived 
from the Latin word, ‘poor’, which means to lack a certain amount of material possession and 
money (Ngbea and Achunike, 2014). A more detained definition of poverty comes from the 
UN’s definition, which states that poverty is a “denial of choice and opportunities, a violation 
of human dignity, [which deprives one the] basic capacity [needed] to participate effectively 
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in society” (United Nations, 2011:2). It is disheartening to know that more than half of the 
world’s population live in this state; the inability to actively participate in one’s society due to 
lack of basic recourses.  
 
Poverty is a major social problem in Nigeria, especially in the northern part of the country. 
Despite the country’s economic strength and growth in recent years, more than half of the 
population still lives below one dollar a day (Ngbea and Achunike, 2014; Familusi, 2019). 
Seeing that Nigeria is considered as one of the strongest economies on the continent, it becomes 
questionable how more than half of its population suffers from poverty. This is because most 
of its wealth is concentrated in the hands of few economic elite class members, who are 
business tycoons, politicians, celebrities, etc. “The largest African economy” title that Nigeria 
has been bequeathed has not stopped it from being named one of the countries with the highest 
poverty rates in the world (Danaan, 2018). Nigeria is considered the largest producer of crude 
oil in Africa, with its agricultural sector booming and contributing to its economic growth. 
However, poverty continues to loom in the country. As argued by Ngbea and Achunike (2014),  
Nigeria’s agricultural sector contributes about 45% to its GDP, yet the country continues to 
import most of its food. For example, in 2018, the country’s domestic rice production was 
estimated at 3.7 million metric tons, but about 5 million metric tons were imported in addition 
to that (Nzeka, 2018). Such high agricultural imports can be attributed to the large population 
of Nigeria, hence its food deficit.  
 
To top it all, the increasing in Boko Haram insurgency has increased the rate of poverty in 
Nigeria, especially in the northern part of the country. Since the active operation of Boko 
Haram began in 2002, poverty rates increased drastically. By 2012, it was estimated that, over 
60 million people were living on less than 1 USD a day in Nigeria (Portal, 2012). As at January 
2019, over 91 million people were living in extreme poverty in Nigeria (The World Bank, 
2019; Okogba, 2019). Considering the fact that the northern part of Nigeria is the bedrock of 
the country’s production of rice and livestock, the continued Boko Haram attacks in the region 
have affected the locals’ ability to continue to produce these foods. For example, there has been 
a decline in grain production from 6.9 million hectares in 2017 to 3.8 million hectares in 2018 
(Nzeka, 2018). In most Boko Haram attacks, villages are looted, agricultural produce is stolen 
by Boko Haram invaders, and livestock are forcefully taken from their owners (Dele, 2018; 
Awojobi, 2014). For example, in September 2018, a Boko Haram group attacked three small 
villages in Bornu state. It attacked Dala-Melari, Fuguri and Femari villages, where it violently 
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forced villagers to give up their food and livestock, and burnt down people’s houses and farm 
yards (Punch News Nigeria, 2018). The attack left at least 7 people dead, and more than 100 
people homeless, with no more sources of livelihood, seeing that their farm produce and 
livestock were looted (Punch News Nigeria, 2018). This is not the only instance of looting 
carried out by Boko Haram. Sometime in March 2019, another looting took place in Adamawa 
state, where insurgents looted a bank and some shops around the bank. Fortunately, the state 
police were able to counter-attack, which led to the killing of some of the bandits (Aluko, 
2019). Those who escaped were only able to get away with the food they had looted, because 
those with the money were caught and apprehended by members of the Nigerian police force 
who responded to an alert about the attack. Boko Haram activities do not only affect 
production, they have also led to more poverty within the region, seeing that people continue 
to lose their sources of livelihood/income (Dele, 2018; Familusi, 2019).  
 
Noting that the northern part of Nigeria was already known for its high poverty rate, the 
increase of the Boko Haram insurgency has made the situation worse. The effect of the Boko 
Haram insurgency on poverty continues to increase, with issues like poor nutrition, lack of 
access to quality education and healthcare, increased crime amongst youths, etc. causing 
human insecurity (Ikpe, 2017). Due to the lootings and destroying of farms, the northerners are 
left to settle for the little food remaining. Also, in most cases, the little food left for the people 
is of minimum nutritional value, which further leads to malnutrition and diet related diseases. 
For example, Adamawa, Yobe and Borno, currently the most affected states by the Boko 
Haram insurgency, recorded the highest malnutrition rates in Nigeria (UNICEF, 2018). Due to 
the continued attacks and threats by Boko Haram, in the above mentioned states, the food 
deficit is on the rise. As such, people lack adequate access to balanced diets and have no access 
to adequate food to keep them going. As compared to other states in the country, in the northern 
states, especially Yobe, Adamawa and Bornu states, children are suffering from severe/acute 
malnutrition (UNICEF, 2018), with little signs of hope for assistance from the government.   
 
Finally, to make it worse, many International Organizations (IOs) and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) that used to be in the north have all left for fear of their lives (Ikpe, 
2017). This is because, not only does the sect target their organisations, it could also kidnap 
their personnel for ransom, in a bid to continue to make money to support its cause. The rate 
of kidnappings in the northern part of Nigeria has increased over the years, with foreigners 
topping the list of targets. As such, the fact that foreign businesses and organisations are leaving 
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the north, has also affected the region’s economic strength. Their relocation has increased 
poverty rates in the process, given the negative effect on job creation and availability of 
opportunities (Ikpe, 2017). International businesses contributed immensely to livelihoods in 
the northern part of Nigeria because of the employment they provided, which meant that the 
people would have sources of income to access quality living standards and pay for services 
such as healthcare and education etc. Not only was international businesses affected in northern 
parts, Nigeria at large has suffered a great loss of foreign direct investment (FDI) due to the 
country’s political instability (Tochukwu, 2013). In 2013, it was recorded that there was a drop 
of about 21.3 percent in the country’s FDI inflows (Tochukwu, 2013). Seeing that FDI has 
some significant impact on Nigeria’s economic strength, the drop in its inflow, over the years 
is affecting the country’s growth. For example, by the fourth quarter of 2012, FDI was over 
3000 USD million, however, this has dropped drastically, where in 2018 it was at  about 300 
USD million (Trading Economics, 2019).   
 
Poverty and illiteracy, as effects of Boko Haram insurgency in the northern part of Nigeria, are 
interlinked. Illiteracy is a product of poverty, and vice versa. In northern Nigeria, not only is 
the rate of poverty higher, compared to other parts of the country, illiteracy rates also top the 
chart in the region (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). UNICEF (2019) reported that more 
than 60% of children in northern part of Nigeria, especially in Adamawa, Yobe and Bornu, 
suffer from illiteracy due to the continued Boko Haram attacks in those states. In northern 
Nigeria, the standard of education is not as strong as in other parts of the country because of 
the region’s immense focus on agricultural production and livestock farming. However, since 
the establishment of Boko Haram, and their continued attacks in the region, many school 
buildings have been destroyed. As a result, there are less schools to go around. One of the Boko 
Haram strategies is to bomb schools, because it believes that western education is negatively 
influencing the people, and also making it difficult for it to continue to recruit into its sect. So 
for Boko Haram, bombing schools provides an opportunity for the group to expand, since less 
schools mean more youths available to manipulate. The bombing of schools has also created 
severe fears in the hearts. Parents are scared to send their children to school, for fear of them 
being killed or kidnapped while there (Signe, 2018). Some parents would rather home-school 
their children, of which, in most cases, the parents are not academically capable to do so. Thus, 
they pass down their ‘illiteracy’ in the process. Also, when more students are out of school due 
to the fear of being killed or kidnapped, they are deprived of the opportunity to learn, which 
then increases their illiteracy resulting in poor literacy rates in the region.  
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Boko Haram’s most prominent argument is that, western ‘education is a sin’, as its name Boko 
Haram translates, hence it campaigns against education and enlightenment. This has been 
evident in its activities, through the kidnapping of students and the destruction of schools and 
educational facilities (Signe, 2018). It is widely known that education is a powerful weapon. 
The sect is also aware of that, which is why it is doing everything it can to make sure that it 
destroys the influence of education within its jurisdiction, a case example being the major 
kidnappings carried out by the sect in the Chibok school girls case of 2014. The militant group 
stormed a female school and kidnapped 276 girls from the school, without the government or 
the police being able to stop them (BBC News, 2017; Mbah, 2019). This event inspired a global 
movement whereby millions of people from all over the world urged the government to help 
return the girls. However, more than 5 years later, more than 100 of the girls are yet to return. 
This is after around 111 girls escaped from Boko Haram zone. This particular kidnapping 
stirred fear in the lives of the people, which led to parents withdrawing their female children 
from schools. Some were married off at very young ages, whiles others were home schooled. 
Not up to 5 years after the kidnapping, a similar incident occurred in 2018, in the Dapchi town, 
in northern Nigeria, where more than 100 schoolgirls went missing on the 19th of February 
(Signe, 2018). The Nigerian military force embarked on the mission to free the girls, 2 were 
killed, 76 freed, and the remaining are yet to be found nor released (The Guardian News, 2018).  
 
Finally, Boko Haram’s kidnapping strategy is aimed at ensuring that education is not sought 
after by the northern people, so as to maintain illiteracy. This is in order to make it easy for the 
people to be manipulated into supporting the group’s ideologies and goals (Ebonyi, 2019). 
They apply this strategy because, to them, education is a source of enlightenment, and both, a 
motivation for ending extremism and as well as a strategy for combating terrorism. As such, it 
makes sense for the group to set out to prevent this from happening, by destroying educational 
facilities and kidnapping students. This strategy has thus led to the increase in illiteracy in the 
region. Also, it is further prevents people from accessing better living standards, thus increasing 
the rate of poverty. There is the view that when someone is poor, uneducated and unemployed, 
s/he becomes an easy target for manipulation. This holds true because Boko Haram targets 
poor, educated and unemployed persons in their recruitment exercises.  
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4.1.2. Unemployment  
Increasing unemployment in the north-east part of Nigeria is another effect of the Boko Haram 
insurgency in the country (Ikpe, 2017). As argued earlier, poverty and illiteracy are interlinked. 
Unemployment can be added to the double crisis, hence the triple scourge of poverty, illiteracy 
and unemployment. It can be argued that the Boko Haram sect is aware of this link, and as 
such, makes use of strategies that would affect all three elements. Boko Haram’s bombing of 
educational facilities, its looting strategies and destruction of sources of income, affect 
employment opportunities in the region (Ikpe, 2017). Not having the right educational skills 
needed to secure quality jobs means no source of living, hence the high unemployment rate. 
Not having the financial means to access quality education affects one’s ability to secure 
quality jobs, which in turn will deepen unemployment (Akokpari, 2007). Not having schools 
to attend, seeing that the sect has been destroying schools in the region and causing some to 
abandon school due to fear means not having the skills to make one employable. As argued by 
Tochukwu (2013) and Ikpe (2017), there has been loss of businesses, especially foreign 
investors, because of the threat of Boko Haram, as a result of acts of kidnapping and bombings 
in the area. As such, job availability has dropped drastically in the region. The drastic decrease 
in job availability, plus the increasing population size of the north-east,  have made 
employment difficult to find in the region. There are now more people than there are 
employment opportunities because of the continued insurgency of Boko Haram.  
 
According to Trading Economics (2019), Nigeria’s unemployment rate increased over the year, 
by the end of 2018, it had reached 23.1%, of which over 50% of it sterns from the northern part 
of the country. In 2010, a survey was carried out by the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria 
(MAN), to determine the durability of both, international and local manufacturing companies 
in the country (Okafor, 2011). It was discovered that more than 100 firms in the northern region 
had shut down due to many factors, of which terrorism threat was one of them (Okafor, 2011). 
The fact that the northern part of Nigeria is now unsafe for companies, contributes to economic 
decline. Not only were company buildings being destroyed, businesses began to suffer sales-
deficits. This is because the rate at which people patronized them dropped, and the fear of Boko 
Haram was growing. In towns and villages, severely affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, 
businesses have closed down, banks have reduced their operating hours, and markets have also 
been drastically affected, thereby making it difficult for people to freely access such facilities 
(Othman, et.al, 2015). The Boko Haram insurgency has cost the north-east people socio-
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economically, thus it will take the government longer to elevate the region from the ruins, even 
after the eradication of the militant group, in the future.  
 
Finally, the high unemployment rate in the northern part of the country can further be attributed 
to the growing population therein, which is also linked to the poor healthcare facilities, which 
do not have resources to provide awareness about or to give family planning assistance to the 
people (Adekola, et.al, 2016). Boko Haram’s bombing of healthcare facilities in the region also 
make it difficult for the northern people to access contraceptives or family planning education. 
As such, overpopulation is becoming an issue in the region. This leads us to the socio-economic 
implications of the sect’s insurgency on healthcare services in the northern part of Nigeria. 
 
4.1.3. Poor Healthcare  
In its bid to destabilize the system in northern Nigeria, Boko Haram’s insurgency has also 
affected the healthcare sector, with a number of doctors having left the state in search of safer 
work environments. As a result, the threat of the jihadist group has led to the loss of quality 
doctors in the region (Chukwurah, et.al, 2015). The loss of these doctors has affected healthcare 
services in the region. For example, due to the relocation of doctors and lack of healthcare 
resources, in 2013, there was an outbreak of polio, where more than 50% of the cases were 
recorded in Borno and Yobe (Omole, et.al, 2015). In addition to not having the right resources 
to combat the outbreak the situation was worsened by the continued attacks that the sect carried 
out in the region. In the case of Adamawa, there was an outbreak of diarrhoea, of which there 
were more than 50 cases per week, with no adequate medical resources to combat it (Omole, 
et.al, 2015). The water facilities in the region have been contaminated during attacks by Boko 
Haram; in some cases, the militant group deliberately contaminated the water in order to 
prevent people from having access to it (Adekola, et.al, 2016).  
 
In 2015, there was a measles outbreak in northern Nigeria, with over 100 cases recorded in less 
than a week (Adekola, et.al, 2016; Omole, et.al, 2015). In addition to the aforementioned health 
issues, severe acute malnutrition continues to rampage the northern region, making it even 
more difficult for the people to curb the health crisis. Not having balanced diets aggravates any 
type of sickness, of which in the case of northern Nigeria, the food-deficit created by Boko 
Haram, is one of the factors that continues to aggravate disease outbreaks.  
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Furthermore, the Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in high rates of refugees. This has added 
onto the problems faced by the already overstretched health delivery system in the camps 
(Omole, et.al, 2015; Dele, 2019). Also, due to the unsanitary and risky behaviours of both, 
refugees and the officials at the camps, diseases are easily spread. As Awojobi (2014) argued, 
the Boko Haram insurgency has made it difficult for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) 
treatment to be distributed in the region. Even though the rate of HIV recorded in the north-
eastern part of Nigeria is at 1.1%, being the second lowest in the whole country, the region is 
deprived of access to treatment (Avert.org, 2019; UNAIDS, 2019). Borno state used to be the 
front-runner in antiretroviral treatment (ART) coverage for the north-eastern region. However, 
due to the Boko Haram insurgency, there was a drop in ART coverage from 41.2% to 18%, 
between 2013 and 2016 (Avert.org, 2019). This decline has affected the number of people 
accessing the treatment.   
 
4.1.4. Displacement  
The Boko Haram insurgency has led to the displacement of countless numbers of people in the 
northern part of Nigeria. One of the major implications of the sect’s insurgency is the rise in 
displaced persons and creation of refugee debacles in the northern part of the country (Omilusi, 
2016). Since the emergence of Boko Haram in 2002, and its hard dive into violent attacks 
against the northern people in 2009, there has been a massive record of displacement. As of 
October 2015, the numbers of displaced people in the region was at 1.9 million, and this figure 
has doubled over the past years; by 2019, it was at over 3 million people (Abdulazeez, 2016; 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2019). Following the sect’s kidnapping of the 
Chibok school girls in 2014, its attack on neighbouring villages in the same year and in 2015, 
the rate of displaced people rose across some states in the northern region of Nigeria. As 
recorded, over a million people were displaced from their homes in Maiduguri, which was 
meant to be considered the safest part of Borno state, yet was affected by Boko Haram’s 
activities (Abdulazeez, 2016). Also, in 2015, about 144 000 people were internally displaced 
in Yobe state and about a hundred and thirty five thousand people were displaced in Adamawa 
state (Abdulazeez, 2016). Displacement weighs heavily on the economy of northern Nigerian. 
There are fewer people in the region, to carry out daily socio-economic activities, because 
homes were either abandoned out of fear of the sect or destroyed by the insurgent group. 
Furthermore, where farmyards are looted of produce and livestock, people flee. The losses also 
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make it difficult for the people to return to their homes and villages after the attacks because 
there will be no livelihood incentive to return to.  
 
Displacement led to an increase in refugees from northern Nigeria to parts of central and west 
Africa; many of them were forced to go into hiding in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger (Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2019). As at January 2019, over hundred thousand refugees 
were housed in Cameroon, more than fifty thousand of them in Chad and about two hundred 
thousand in Niger (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2019). This is a huge increase, 
compared to the numbers of refugees recorded in 2015; there were about hundred and seventy 
thousand refugees across all three countries (Abdulazeez, 2016). The increase since 2015 is 
therefore more than hundred percent in less than five years. This is because, over the past five 
years, the Boko Haram insurgency has worsened. There have committed more cases of 
bombings, looting, rape and kidnapping, and this has resulted in the forced displacement of the 
people from affected regions.  
 
It is important to note that Cameroon, Chad and Niger do not have the economic strength that 
Nigeria has, as such the flooding of refugees into their countries has caused major economic 
problems for them (Dauda, 2014). Although displacement has attracted humanitarian 
assistance over the years, the refugee camp conditions are poor, as indicated for example, by 
reports of outbreaks of diseases and shortage of food and basic supplies therein (Solomon, 
2016). In Cameroon, for example, the camp was opened in 2013, and the population there has 
grown by more than 200% from its initial start-up size and intended capacity (Solomon, 2016). 
Seeing that the government is not capacitated to run and maintain the camp, the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) took over the responsibility of maintaining the 
camp, in collaboration with the government of Cameroon (Solomon, 2016; Dauda, 2014). 
UNHCR is responsible for providing food, tents, medical assistance, clothing and basic needs 
at the camp, but the influx of refugees into the camp has posed difficulties for them. They are 
struggling to provide adequate resources and this has negatively affected camp conditions for 
refugees (Solomon, 2016). Due to lack of resources in the camps in 2015, Cameroon and Chad 
were forced to start sending some refugees back to Nigeria, thus posing greater challenges for 
the returnees, seeing that the region’s they had fled remained under threat of attacks and there 
was no available safe housing for them in Nigeria (Abdulazeez, 2016). Those who were 
returned became internally displaced within the northern part of the country.  
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Finally, coupled with the fact that Boko Haram activities caused the displacement of people 
and the creation of refugees, the group also carries out attacks on refugee camps thus further 
complicating the human insecurity problem (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2019). 
As of 2015, new arrivals from northern Nigeria were placed under heavy scrutiny at refugee 
reception centres due to the fact that some refugees were associated with the insurgent group. 
Already plagued with the implications of their attack, the camps became less safe due to 
potential attacks by insurgents. The insurgent group loot humanitarian camps and destroy some 
of their resources in order to force people to flee from there as well (Abdulazeez, 2016). This, 
in essence, causes a huge socio-economic burden for the refugees’ host countries and Nigeria.    
 
To conclude, the Boko Haram insurgency, not only leads to negative socio-economic issues 
effects, the socio-economic implications also promote the growth of Boko Haram. This is so 
because the northern part of Nigeria is already facing several socio-economic challenges and 
Boko Haram insurgency has tripled the challenges therein. Boko Haram, being aware of the 
socio-economic state of the north, used this factor to their advantage by brainwashing the 
people into supporting it. For those who are not educated enough to see that it is a dangerous 
group, they can be brainwashed into joining the sect. Also, because of the high levels of poverty 
in the north, Boko Haram was able to lay its foundation there, at the beginning, when it started 
off as a charity organisation for the people, before shooting into a terrorist group. The Boko 
Haram insurgency has led to the increase in levels of unemployment, poverty, bad healthcare 
services and displacement of people in northern Nigeria. Due to threats posed by the sect, key 
services have been affected: schools have been destroyed, hospitals are experiencing shortages 
of health personnel due to their relocation to safer states, foreign investors have fled due to the 
threat of attacks, recreational parks have been abandoned, and there are fewer patrons for hotel 
businesses etc. These and other challenges have further created an atmosphere of political 
instability in the country.   
 
4.2. Political Implications 
This section discusses the political implications of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It 
will do so by focusing on the following political implications: national insecurity, corruption 
and political instability. The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has political implications 
which have impeded the country’s national development and growth, and tarnished its 
international reputation. Over the years, the Nigeria has lost its international strength, and 
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nationally, political instability has become the order of the day, due to the presence and 
activities of Boko Haram. The jihadist group continues to pose a threat to Nigeria’s security 
system since its violent emergence in 2009 (Shuaibu, et.al, 2015). Their strategies which 
include increased cases of: bombing, kidnapping, looting, raping, etc. are costing the country 
its peace and security, both nationally and regionally.  
 
4.2.1. National Insecurity  
National insecurity has become Nigeria’s daily vice since the violent emergence of the group 
in 2009. Boko Haram has carried out deadly killings of religious and political leaders, of which, 
in some cases, it publicly owned up to it without remorse (Shuaibu, et.al, 2015). The insurgent 
group has also been targeting ordinary Christians and Muslims. This makes it difficult to 
determine who it is really targeting, seeing that it is also killing people from its own religious 
group. In 2016, Modu Bukar, a local leader of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, was killed in 
Potiskum, a north-eastern city in Nigeria, right in front of the mosque where he had just finished 
observing his evening prayers (Abubakar, 2018). Although there are different explanations to 
his killing. One prevailing argument was that he was killed by a member of the Boko Haram 
group. Bukar was one of the Islamic religious leaders who did not agree with the teachings and 
beliefs of the militant group, and in some instances, he had been said to have spoken against 
their doctrines to his congregation (Imams Online, 2019; The Economist, 2018). Also, he did 
not hold the strong beliefs of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, and as such was considered a 
threat to the continued spread of Boko Haram ideologies. This would explain why he was 
targeted and killed by a group member. In a case like that, where people are being targeted 
because of their counter Boko Haram ideologies, many Nigerians are scared to speak against 
the sect, for the fear of being targeted next. Also, not knowing who exactly is working for or 
with what sect, speaking against them means putting one’s life at risk so, many desist from 
doing that. The people are faced with high levels of insecurity, as noone seems safe.  
 
Also, currently Christians who live in the northern part of the country live in fear of their lives 
because some of the attacks laid by the group are against Christians. In April of 2019, there 
was a door-to-door attack against Christians in the north, where the sect members went to 
people’s homes, killing anyone who identified as Christians (Lowry, 2019). About around 8pm 
on the 29th of April 2019, Boko Haram fighters raided a village in Adamawa state which hosts 
a large following of Christianity in the community of Kuda. By the time they ended their raid 
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that night, over 25 Christians had been killed (Lowry, 2019). Families lost loved ones, while 
some were forced to flee because their lives were at more risk at the hands of Boko Haram. 
One particular family, a day after the attack had happened, was about to bury their lost loved 
one, when another attack was launched on them. The horror of having to bury a loved one, and 
then to be attacked in the process, is very disturbing. To think that the national security force 
was unable to assist or provide the needed protection for the people, makes matters worse. 
Communities prone to Boko Haram attacks in most northern states, are losing their stability 
because people are fleeing, to free themselves from the Boko Haram insurgency.  
 
The strategic spread of members of Boko Haram now poses more threat to the people. One 
argument has it that some of the group’s members are disguising themselves as ordinary 
citizens to ‘flee’ to other parts of the country and neighbouring countries, where they continue 
laying their attacks and spreading Boko Haram control in the country (Abdulazeez, 2016). This 
makes it difficult for the national security force to accurately distinguish between members of 
the group and civilians.  
 
Furthermore, the Boko Haram insurgency has led to the collapse of the country’s national 
security (Shehu, 2015; Shuaibu, et.al, 2015). There have been attacks on police buildings and 
other government security institutions, which makes it even more frightening seeing that the 
sect is able to stage attacks against government’s security infrastructure and yet have not been 
defeated by the government. Boko Haram attacks have further exposed the weakness of the 
Nigerian security system, because till date, state security forces have not been able to defeat 
the militant group. One of the major attacks that exposed the weakness in the national security 
force took place in 2010.  In 2010, Boko Haram launched a prison break, where it broke into a 
prison in Bauchi and freed over 700 inmate without the police being able to stop it (Shuaibu, 
et.al, 2015). The event was very alarming and revealed the weak nature of the country’s 
security sector. It also reflected the group’s capacity to undermine national security. Thus 
Nigeria plunged into a deep security crisis, seeing that even the national security structures 
were not exempt from attacks by Boko Haram, besides being unable to provide protection for 
the people. Also, the attack showed how capable and powerful Boko Haram is, compared to 
the national security sector of the country. To make matters worse, in 2011, the group attacked 
the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, where more than fifteen people were killed and over 
sixty people were injured (Thurston, 2017). To think that they were able to attack such a highly 
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respected international organization, and still get away with it, revealed, not only their strength, 
but their dangerous nature and disregard for powerful international organizations.  
 
Another incident that showed that the Nigerian national security sector is weak and unable to 
protect its people was one which occurred in 2014 whereby “some of the battlefield soldiers 
fighting the group in Maiduguri attempted a mutiny by firing off their commanding officer. 
The soldiers had complained that the insurgents outgun them as a result of more sophisticated 
weapons used by the sect members.” (Shuaibu, et.al, 2015: 259).  It is devastating to think that 
Nigerian soldiers did not have better weapons to fight against the militant group. The fact that 
the soldiers even got to the point of not obeying their commanding officer due to the fear of 
being defeated by Boko Haram, puts the national security of Nigeria in jeopardy. Also, the rate 
of corruption in the country was further revealed by this incident, because the government was 
said to have pumped in billions of naira into fighting against the insurgent group, but there 
seems to be little to show for it (Ogbuehl, 2018).  
 
4.2.2. Corruption and Political Instability 
Boko Haram is feeding off the already existing corruption in Nigeria, which has affected the 
country’s ranking on international indices, and this is contributing to political instability. For a 
better understanding, corruption can be defined as the misuse of public and entrusted power 
for private benefit (Jimoh, et al, 2017). Although there are many other definitions, this 
particular one fits directly into the case in question. It is true that Nigeria has always been 
known for its high rate of corruption. However, since the aggressive emergence of Boko Haram 
and its continued attacks, corrupt activities within the political system in the country have 
increased (Ogbuehl, 2018). Between 2009 and 2018, Nigeria moved from 134 to 144 on the 
least corrupt countries index, from a total of 180 countries, with a score of 27 out of 100, where 
0 is highly corrupt (Transparency International, 2018; Trading Economics, 2019). Since the 
violent emergence of Boko Haram in 2009, the country has moved up the corruption index 
rank, with the score of 27/100, as at 2018.  
Moving forward, the Boko Haram insurgency has been worsened by corrupt political activities. 
In recent years, the government has claimed to have pumped in millions of naira into the fight 
against the sect’s insurgency but little to no changes have been witnessed. This can be attributed 
to the fact that the funds are being misused and squandered by those put in charge of it. As 
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argued by Shuaibu, et al (2015), the Nigerian security force lacks major weaponries needed to 
combat Boko Haram; in fact, Boko Haram possesses more and better weapons as compared to 
the Nigerian military. This raises the question of where the funds the government claims have 
been allocated to combat Boko Haram, have gone to? Why is it that, till date, the national 
security forces are yet to win the fight against Boko Haram, and why is there no trace of the 
funds said to have been pumped into the fight?  This is because politicians are using the issue 
of the Boko Haram insurgency to acquire more funds into their own accounts (Hashimu and 
Ancell, 2017). And, in a case where the country’s corruption rate was already high, Boko 
Haram makes it even easier for exploitation to prevail.  
In addition, since the emergence of Boko Haram, political leaders have strategically used the 
promised to silence Boko Haram as a campaign strategy during election periods, even though 
they hardly do anything about it after they have been put into power. For example, president 
Buhari has always fed off from the threats of Boko Haram and the fears of the people, to further 
his own political agenda (Orji, 2019). In the 2015 election, the president focused his campaign 
on defeating Boko Haram; he promised that if he was elected he would make sure the militant 
group was defeated before the end of his tenure. This strategy worked out well for him, seeing 
that he defeated former president Jonathan, with over two point five million votes difference 
(BBC News, 2015). However, after the end of that tenure, Boko Haram has rather become 
more powerful, even far stronger than the national security forces. Till date, the president is 
still yet to achieve his promise to the people, by defeating the insurgent group.  Also, even in 
those affected states, governors have been using the people’s fear for Boko Haram to further 
their election agenda, and in the end they do not make the effort to actually keep to their 
campaign promises (Ogbuehl, 2018). On several occasions, the president has publicly claimed 
that the national security force has defeated Boko Haram, knowing very well that his 
pronouncements were far from the truth (Ogbuehl, 2018). This shows the level of corruption 
that the country breeds, and also how difficult it will be for the government to actually defeat 
the jihadist group. Not only have politicians used the fear of Boko Haram to further their own 
political agenda, there have been some claims that some of them are supporting the group. This 
was particularly argued by Ogbuehl (2018:368), when the author said that “government blamed 
some members of its cabinet for sabotaging its efforts, with the claims that Boko-Haram had 
successfully infiltrated all organs and arms of government; the army also accused some of the 
officers of its woes and many failures based on allegations of leakage of sensitive information 
to the sect.” One might argue that this claim was not proven, but it is important to know that 
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the Nigerian Army and the Defence headquarters found more than ten of its senior military 
officers guilty of the offence, after they were tried (Ogbuehl, 2018). Boko Haram’s ability to 
co-opt political figures into indirectly working for them reveals the level of corruption that has 
creeped into the political system of the country.  
 
Finally, there is a claim that, military officials are benefiting from the fight against Boko 
Haram, and as such are not as willing as they should be to defeat and put an end to Boko Haram 
(Jimoh, et al, 2017). Transparency International has accused the Nigerian military force of 
creating fake contracts for the fight against Boko Haram, in order to defraud the government 
and gain personal funds (Jimoh, et al, 2017). This is one of the reasons why the fight against 
the militant group has been difficult, and yet to be won. For the military force, using the threat 
of the Boko Haram insurgency to further their own financial interests is more paramount than 
defeating the group. This the military force make sure that the fight against Boko Haram is not 
won, so that they can continue to benefit from it. This has further created political implications 
for the country because its political status remains relatively unstable.  
 
The country has become more politically unstable since the violent emergence of Boko Haram 
in 2009. The insurgency of the group has drastically increased social injustice and 
discrimination based on ethnicity and religion, in the country (Raji and Wahab, 2016). The fact 
that Boko Haram stems from an Islamic background and from the northern part of the country, 
means that many people now see Muslims in a negative light hence, in some instances they are 
treated with suspicion and distrust. Considering that Nigeria has always been divided on ethnic 
and religious lines, this has heightened already existent tensions thus discrimination along 
those lines is now more prevalent (Ogundiya, 2016). This has affected the political strength of 
the country, as the government has lost its ability to address the challenges of the people.  
 
Finally, in the cases of the 2015 and 2019 elections, for example, the government postponed 
elections from their initial dates citing claims that there were some logistical challenges that 
needed to be addressed in order to avoid violence during the election (Blanchard, 2015; Dibie-
Ike, 2019). However, after the said postponements, electoral periods were still marked by 
violence. The government was unable to maintain a stable political atmosphere, even after 
postponing the election in order to provide the citizens with the needed security and political 
stability. Even though the election was termed successful by the government, there were some 
northern states that experienced violence at the hands of Boko Haram during the phase. For 
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example, during the 2015 elections, Boko Haram disrupted voting processes in Borno, Yobe 
and Adamawa, leading to the deaths of some civilians (Blanchard, 2015). The reality that the 
government did not learn from that occurrence, such that four years later, elections were still 
violent and threatened by the Boko Haram insurgency shows the weakness of the 
administration, against the jihadist group (Amaza, 2019).  
 
To conclude, Boko Haram has shown itself to be an insurgent group that is difficult to defeat, 
while the government of Nigeria has shown that it is weak and unable to be able to defeat the 
group. Since the violent emergence of Boko Haram in 2009, the group’s insurgency in the 
country has costed Nigeria its political stability, integrity and national security.  From 2009 to 
date, Nigeria has been suffering from the drastic increase in national insecurity, corruption and 
political instability, which have had an adverse effect on national development. The national 
security force’s inability to defeat Boko Haram, even with all the funds and international 
assistance that have been provided can be attributed to corruption. Military officials are using 
the jihadist group to enrich their personal accounts. For Boko Haram to be defeated, there is a 
lot that the government needs to change within its system. Before then, the sect will continue 




Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
5.1. Conclusion  
Human security goes beyond the absence of conflict. The concept encompasses seven broad 
aspects, including economic, health, food, environmental, personal, political and community 
security. Each of these components is required for the attainment of human security. in some 
cases each serves as a condition for the existence of the other. For example, health security is 
informed by adequate food supply which is in turn dependant on a sustainable environment. 
Therefore in order to achieve human security, all of the above components must exist.  
 
Majorly, this research project finds that Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has costed the 
country its human security. Although, Nigeria was already experiencing economic and political 
instability, between 2009 and 2019, the insurgent group’s activities have further exacerbated 
the situation, which has resulted in the severe violation of human security of the people. Also, 
it finds that the government of Nigeria lacks the capacity to defeat Boko Haram, not only due 
to its limited human and resource capital, but also because of the increasing corruption rate in 
the country. Finally,  
 
In arriving to the above findings, this thesis used Boko Haram’s insurgency to evaluate human 
security risks in Nigeria, from two aspects: socio-economic and political perspectives. It began 
by detailing the background of the emergence of Boko Haram. The thesis argues that the sect 
started off as a charity organisation before transforming into a violent terrorist group. Another 
school of thought is based on political conspiracy which argues that the group is traced to the 
political agenda of northern politicians, and President Jonathan’s administration. 
Unfortunately, due to lack of compelling evidence and the fact that the date of the emergence 
of Boko Haram and its insurgency does not correlate with the time president Jonathan came 
power, this study therefore looked at how the group grew from a charity based organisation to 
a violent terrorist formation. The main position of Boko Haram is its hatred of western 
education. In addition, the group exploited the advantage of already existing socio-economic 
challenges in the northern part of Nigeria, to facilitate its rise.  
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As well, the thesis noted that the Nigerian government’s response to Boko Haram has been 
inadequate. Accordingly, the government has failed to defeat the sect, more than fifteen years 
since its emergence. Boko Haram grew stronger and stronger as the government showed an 
incapacity to defeat it. Boko Haram’s access to and use of sophisticated weapons gives little 
indication of the Nigerian government’s ability to eventually defeat it. 
 
Finally, to answer the research question on the human security implications of the Boko Haram 
insurgency for Nigeria, the thesis looked at the socio-economic and political implications of its 
activities. It asserts that Boko Haram’s insurgency continues to negatively affect Nigeria’s 
socio-economic and political stability. Boko Haram is considered a militant group that has been 
terrorising the country since its emergence in 2002, especially in the northern part of the 
country. As a result of the sect’s insurgency in the country, poverty increased over the years, 
especially in the north-eastern part. Also, due to the continued bombing of school buildings 
and kidnapping of school children, the rate of illiteracy has doubled in the northern region. 
This is because there are fewer quality schools left and people are dropping out due to the fear 
of being kidnapped. The Boko Haram insurgency has further increased the rate or refugees and 
displaced persons in the country. And, to top that up, the country’s political and national 
security have been jeopardized, which means no one is safe. The national security forces are 
constantly targeted by Boko Haram, and in most cases, they are defeated by the sect. This is 
due to the fact that the Nigerian security forces lack adequate resources needed to defeat Boko 
Haram. Nigeria will continue to be socio-economically and politically affected by the 
insurgency of Boko Haram if the government does not begin to make strides towards 
countering Boko Haram threats and attacks.  
 
In summary, this thesis has been able to determine the socio-economic and political 
implications of Boko Haram’s insurgency for human security in Nigeria. To be able to defeat 
Boko Haram, the Nigerian government needs to change its counter-terrorism strategies. In most 
cases, governments tend to settle for military responses to terrorism, which always backfires. 
In the process, Boko Haram became even stronger and angrier.  Therefore, the government of 
Nigeria needs to focus more on dealing with corruption within the military sector and the socio-
economic issues that are fuelling Boko Haram’s growth in the country.  
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5.2. Recommendations and Further Research 
Since the emergence of Boko Haram, the Nigerian government has been unable to defeat them. 
The socio-economic and political implications of Boko Haram’s insurgency will have negative 
lasting effects if not stopped now. The government needs to start trying out approaches other 
than the usual military response. This section will look at some strategies that the Nigerian 
government needs to put in place in order to defeat Boko Haram. These include: undergoing 
anti-corruption training of military officials, addressing socio-economic challenges, 
implementing a bottom-up approach, providing an intensive training program for the national 
security force, and increasing international assistance.   
 
One of the major strategies needed to defeat Boko Haram is for government of Nigeria to 
implement a compulsory anti-corruption training for military officials handling the funds and 
any matter related to the fight against Boko Haram. The increasing rate of corruption in the 
Nigerian military continues to benefit Boko Haram insurgent group. As such, the jihadist group 
is yet to be defeated because of the continued misuse of the funds allocated for the fight against 
the group (Ogbuehl, 2018). Many political and military officials in the country are more 
concerned with enriching themselves from the funds being pumped into the fight against Boko 
Haram. As Solomon (2017) reported, Nigeria has lost over $15 billion in fraudulent activates 
by the military, in the fight against Boko Haram, where money has disappeared through the 
payment of ‘ghost soldiers’ and procurement of fraudulent arms deals. Therefore, military 
officials need to be trained on how to make adequate use of those funds, and to be encouraged 
to report any corrupt dealings within the sector. Also, the government needs to be transparent 
in its activities with the military sector, as this will provide a system of accountability within 
the government and military sector. Lastly, it is important that any form of financial assistance 
pumped into the fight against Boko Haram is well monitored directly by donor agents. This 
will limit the misuse of funds by corrupt politicians who are put in charge of those funds. 
Addressing corruption is one of the most important strategy in defeating Boko Haram because 
it spills over to other parts, seeing that corruption remains a driver of insecurity and hinders 
progress (Solomon, 2017).  
 
Another major step the Nigerian government needs to take is addressing the socio-economic 
issues that are plaguing the northern part of the country (Shuaibu, et.al, 2015; Akinbo, 2015). 
As proven, Boko Haram is thriving in the region due to the high rate of unemployment, high 
illiteracy rate due to lack of educational opportunities, high rate of poverty, etc. Seeing that 
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these issues laid the foundation for Boko Haram, addressing them will mean destroying that 
foundation that makes its insurgency possible. As Akinbi (2015) stated, there is the need for 
the Nigerian government to address the poverty issue that is looming in the northeast part of 
the country. For most youths in the area, joining and supporting Boko Haram elevates them 
economically because the sect provides them with food and financial assistance. Being 
unemployed means having enough time to do nothing, which makes them join the jihadist 
group in order to feel they are no longer jobless. Also, it is easier for an uneducated person to 
be manipulated, which is why majority of the jihadist group members are illiterate. So, if the 
Nigerian government is serious about defeating Boko Haram in the country, it needs to start by 
eradicating the high unemployment amongst youths, poverty, and illiteracy in the northeast 
part of the country.  
 
After Boko Haram has been defeated, it is important for the Nigerian government to initiate 
the building of new schools and vocational training centres in the region in order to replace the 
ones that have been destroyed (Shuaibu, et.al, 2015). Having more accessible quality schools 
means more enlightenment, which will help prevent the re-emergence and support of Boko 
Haram. In addition to that, those unable to attend schools can be given the opportunity to 
acquire vocational skills to enable them to engage in income generating activities. Having a 
source of income, as well as being busy will make it difficult for them to have the time to 
consider supporting or to rekindle their support for Boko Haram. Finally, these schools and 
vocational centres need to be subsidised by the Nigerian government to ensure affordable 
access. Teachers at these proposed facilities need to be well trained, paid and provided with 
good working conditions to make all aspects of their work enjoyable. 
 
Boko Haram continues to thrive in these areas because of the socio-economic issues that work 
to their advantage. Once these issues are addressed and measures are put in place to make sure 
terrorism does not re-emerge in the region, only then can the government’s counter-terrorism 
strategy yield positive outcomes.  
 
Moving forward, for the government to defeat Boko Haram it has to implement a bottom-top 
approach in dealing with the issue. Locals should be actively involved in the fight against the 
jihadist group, not just treating them as a separate entity. The Nigerian government and its 
military forces need the assistance of the locals, considering that they are more equipped with 
contextual knowhow and information on how some of them are recruited by Boko Haram. 
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They will be able to give better information on what the sect is up to, who the real members 
are and even how to navigate the area to capture and arrest them. As Olojo (2018) argued, the 
national security forces are always guilty of human right violations on the locals, in their fight 
against Boko Haram. Instead of carrying the locals along in their fight against the group, the 
militia abuse them, thus making it difficult for the people to trust or cooperate with them. It has 
been opined that locals would rather support the Boko Haram sect members instead of the 
national security force because of the high human right violations they face at their hands 
(Waddinton, 2014).  
 
Apart from actively involving locals, the government also needs to consider partnering with 
some NGOs in their fight against the jihadist sect (Akinbi, 2015). In most cases, the locals are 
more trusting of NGOs than they are of governmental officials. This means that those NGOs 
will be able to connect better with the locals in finding better locally supportive ways to defeat 
the sect. The national security forces are still unable to connect with nor gain support of the 
local people because of the human right violations they consistently commit against them. In 
that regard, the Nigerian security forces needs more training on human rights violations and 
community engagement.  
 
The Nigerian government needs to institute an intensive high level anti-corruption and military 
training program for the national security forces. It is a much needed strategy if the government 
wants to defeat Boko Haram. Nigerian soldiers are known, globally, for their human right 
violations during battles, and this can be attributed to the poor training they are given when 
enrolling into service (Olojo, 2018; Waddinton, 2014). They need to be trained on how to treat 
women and children when in battle, because there have been cases of them abusing and 
violating these vulnerable groups. If they begin to treat the local people with respect and not 
suspicion, then will there be a possible cooperation between them, thus making it easier and 
more possible to defeat Boko Haram. The president needs to pay more attention to 
strengthening the Nigerian “Join Task Force in the area of intelligence gathering, effective 
surveillance, and security strategies” (Akinbi, 2015). In so doing they would be able to gather 
accurate information on the group, to know when to attack and when to retreat. This will help 
give them an upper hand against the Boko Haram insurgents, thereby minimizing casualties.  
 
It is very apparent that the Nigerian government lacks both, financial and human resources to 
defeat Boko Haram. As such, there is a need for increased international assistance. International 
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assistance from African Union (AU) and UN is needed to enable the government to defeat 
Boko Haram. As also stated by Leroux (2016), supports from the US and Europe will go a long 
way in making sure that the Boko Haram insurgency is defeated. There is the need for the 
international community to assist the Nigerian government in administering anti-terrorism 
training for the national security force. As previously stated, Nigeria’s military lacks the skills 
needed to fight against terrorism, and they are known for always violating human rights during 
combat. As such, more highly skilled international experts need to be sent to help train them in 
order to make it easier for Boko Haram to be defeated. To mitigate any violation of human 
rights by both national and international forces, there should be the implementation of 
mechanism to monitor and detect human rights violations.  
 
Also, the Nigerian government lacks the financial capacity to provide necessary military 
resources needed for the fight against Boko Haram. As such, there is the need for the 
international community to donate to the Nigerian government in order to remedy the lack of 
military resources required to defeat the Boko Haram insurgency. Lastly, those who have been 
displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency need long-term humanitarian assistance, which the 
Nigerian government does not have the capacity to provide (Human Rights Watch, 2019). 
Therefore, the international community should increase its humanitarian assistance through 
long-term strategies which would ensure sustainable livelihoods for the displaced.  
 
To conclude, the use of military strategy in countering Boko Haram’s insurgency in Nigeria 
would produce positive outcomes once the government begins to focus on human (in)security 
factors that allow the sect to thrive. The Nigerian government could defeat Boko Haram if it is 
able to gather support from the local people. That is a major requisite element in defeating the 
sect. In addition, gathering should be complemented by addressing the socio-economic 
challenges facing the region and making sure that their human rights are not violated. Without 
international assistance, the Nigerian government will not be able to defeat Boko Haram 
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